EUSA Review 21/1 Winter 2008 by No, Author
EUSA Review    Winter 2008   1 
Volume 21, No. 1
Winter 2008
From the Chair
Liesbet Hooghe
INVEST IN EUSA
eusa is launching the option of institutional membership. 
Institutional membership will allow graduate students in 
your center or department to attend EUSA conferences 
for free or for a reduced rate. It also gives your institu-
tion space in the Review and a prominent hyperlink on 
the EUSA website. If you are a director or chair, please 
consider becoming a member; if you are affiliated to 
a center, department, or institute, please bring this to 
the attention of your chair or director. We have devised 
a flexible two-tier system that ties privileges to the 
level of investment your institution chooses to make. 
EUSA Institutional Membership
•  Sustaining Members: $1000 per year in return 
for:  free conference access for up to 4 graduate stu-
dents,* one free 1-page advertisement/announce-
ment in the Review per year ($250 currently)
•  Contributing Members: $500 per year in return 
for:  25% conference fee reduction for up to 4 gradu-
ate students,* 50% reduction on one 1/2-page ad-
vertisement in the Review per year ($125 currently)
* minimum subscription of two years
All institutional members are hyperlinked on 
the website, with Sustaining Members hyperlinked 
through their logo. To enroll, please email EUSA at 
eusa@pitt.edu.
In return, you will help EUSA diversify and so-
lidify its financial basis. EUSA finances its opera-
tions through three main sources: membership dues 
and conference proceeds; a biennial EU Commis-
sion grant; and an annual contribution by our host 
institution. These have not kept up with inflation, 
even though we have cut operating costs. Rais-
ing membership fees—the easiest solution—would 
make EUSA harder to afford for younger scholars or 
members from less endowed institutions. So we turn 
to the stronger members in the EUSA community to 
help the association continue its unique role in nur-
turing networks of Europeanists around the globe. 
Institutional membership is the most recent in a line   
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Turkey and the EU: Where Do We Stand?
it has become common in recent years to observe 
that the fate of Turkey’s membership bid may shape 
the future nature of the EU more than anything else. 
Thus I was very pleased that some of the world’s top 
experts on Turkish-EU relations agreed to contribute 
to my first issue as Editor. Birol Yeşilada is Professor 
of Political Science at Portland State University, and 
holds an endowed chair in Contemporary Turkish 
Studies. He opens the Forum with a survey of where 
the accession negotiations stand today and the basic 
benefits and challenges that accession offers to both 
sides. Hugh Pope is Senior Analyst on issues con-
cerning Turkey and Cyprus at the International Crisis 
Group. He is a frequent contributor to the Wall Street 
Journal and other high-profile outlets, and his latest 
book (Sons of the Conquerors: The Rise of the Turkic 
World) was named a “book of the year” by The Econ-
omist. His contribution considers in more detail how 
and why views of Turkish accession within the EU 
have evolved in recent years. Meltem Müftüler-Baç is 
Professor of International Relations and Jean Mon-
net Professor at Sabanci University in Istanbul. Her 
essay shifts more to the Turkish viewpoint, discuss-
ing the role of EU conditionality in Turkish domestic 
political change. Şahin Alpay, finally, is Professor of 
Political Science at Bahcesehir University in Istanbul. 
He delves more deeply into the role of the military in 
Turkish politics, providing both a historical overview 
and a more specific account of civil-military relations 
as the EU talks have proceeded. These experts are 
unanimous that Turkish accession will be good for 
Turkey and good for the EU—but also realistic that 
many people on both sides do not agree with them.
-Craig Parsons
EUSA Review Editor 
(continued on p. 31)
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Where Do Turkey’s Accession 
Negotiations Stand?
Birol Yeşilada
relations between the european union (EU) and Turkey 
have never been easy, but now they seem to have 
reached a crucial crossroad. Indeed, they look to 
be entering the most difficult time of their forty-five 
year association. Despite the initial enthusiasm that 
followed the start of accession talks in 2005, two sig-
nificant developments seriously damaged EU-Turkey 
relations: a new wave of conflict about Cyprus, and the 
election of Nicolas Sarkozy as president of France.  
A staunch opponent of Turkish accession, Sarkozy 
prefers a “privileged partnership” to membership and 
has been lobbying other European leaders to adopt 
his position.  He succeeded in rallying the support of 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel and now leads a 
coalition of anti-Turkey states.  The Cyprus issue is 
more complex and pits both sides against each other 
over treaty obligations and political promises. On 
December 11, 2006, EU ministers agreed to punish 
Turkey for refusing to open its ports and airports to 
EU member Cyprus. At that time, the EU indefinitely 
froze eight of 35 “chapters” in the accession nego-
tiations. Turkey refuses to open its ports because it 
wants a de facto embargo lifted on the self-declared 
Turkish republic of northern Cyprus, which the EU 
promised to do following Turkish Cypriots’ approval 
of the internationally supported Annan Peace Plan 
for Cyprus in April 2004.  The Greek Cypriots had 
rejected the plan by a 3-to-1 margin.  At the time 
the Greek Cypriot government strongly opposed the 
plan’s power sharing arrangement between the two 
communities, the financial formula for compensation 
of private property, and the amount of land allocated 
to two federal states.
A more step-by-step summary of critical recent 
events includes:
2005, October: Accession talks begin 	
on 35 “negotiating chapters” of the EU acquis 
communautaire.
2006, June: The EU and Turkey open 	
and close the first and shortest of the chapters, 
on Science and Research.
2006, December: The EU freezes 	
the opening of eight chapters over Turkey’s 
refusal to open its ports and airports to traffic 
from Cyprus.
2007, January: The EU and Turkey 	
open the negotiating chapter on Enterprises 
and Industrial Policy.
2007, April: The AKP government in 	
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Turkey launches its own seven-year national 
action plan to move toward adopting the EU 
acquis.
2007 June: Two more chapters of the 	
EU acquis, Statistics and Financial Control, 
are opened for negotiation. But France blocks 
the expected opening of the chapter on work 
towards European monetary union, in line with 
new President Sarkozy’s determination to block 
five chapters that would pave the way for Turkey 
to become a member of the EU.
2007, December: To further add insult to 	
injury, the French member of COREPER (the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives that 
forms the heart of the EU Council of Ministers), 
Pierre Sellal, demands removal of “accession” 
from “accession negotiations” that is part of the 
final summit report of the European summit on 
December 14, 2007. Furthermore, the report’s 
section on enlargement omits the phrase “the 
objective of accession negotiations is member-
ship [in the EU]” when referring to Turkey and 
revises the title of meetings that open acces-
sion chapters from “Accession Conference” 
to “Intergovernmental Conference.”1 Austria 
and Germany give full support to the French 
position. 
Potential Benefits of Membership
There is no doubt that accession of Turkey presents 
challenges and benefits for both sides.  For Turkey, 
benefits include support for the consolidation of democ-
racy, an increase in economic competitiveness, and 
finalization of Atatürk’s goal of permanently anchoring 
the country in the European family of nation states.  As 
the EU Commission observed, “Changes to the Turkish 
political and legal system over the past years are part 
of a longer process and it will take time before the spirit 
of the reforms is fully reflected in the attitudes of ex-
ecutive and judicial bodies, at all levels and throughout 
the country.”2 Given the above concerns, continuous 
and effective implementation of democratic reforms 
is necessary for Turkey in order to improve the quality 
and consolidation of democracy.  Further institutional 
reforms during the EU accession process would be 
helpful in this regard.  
On the economic front, EU membership would fur-
ther bring Turkey into the global economy.  Following 
EU’s decision to start accession talks with Turkey, FDI 
jumped to $10 billion in 2005.  In the following year, 
this figure doubled to around $20 billion. With access to 
other EU markets, unhindered flow of capital and labor 
would further serve as a catalyst of economic growth.
For the EU, Turkey’s membership will also bring 
benefits. First, it will send a clear message to the 
world that the EU is not a Christian club and so re-
fute the “clash of civilizations” argument.  Second, it 
will strengthen the European Security and Defense 
Identity (ESDI) with considerable military capabilities 
and further smooth out the NATO-ESDI partnership.3 
Third, Turkey’s membership will go a long way toward 
settling Greek-Turkish problems, much like other bi-
lateral disputes that member states learned to settle 
peacefully in the EU.  Perhaps the best example of 
this is France and Germany.  Fourth, Turkey would be 
a secure energy corridor for Europe for carrying oil and 
natural gas from the Caspian Sea basin and Central 
Asia. And fifth, Turkey will contribute to economic revival 
of EU’s competitiveness in global affairs.4 Yet, despite 
such clear benefits of Turkey’s membership, there are 
serious challenges facing both sides.  
Challenges of Membership
For the Turks, challenges include surrender of 
economic and political sovereignty to Brussels’ supra-
national institutions, an effective overhaul of Turkey’s 
domestic political landscape, potential change in state-
religion relations (strict laicism versus secularism), and 
implications for Greek-Turkish relations (particularly 
Greek/Greek Cypriot demands for concessions on Cy-
prus and the Aegean).  Public opinion in Turkey has also 
turned more negative toward EU membership – from a 
high of 72 % in favor in 2004 to 52 % in 2007.  Today 
most of the Turkish secular political parties, the Turkish 
military, and leftists and ultra nationalists view EU mem-
bership with suspicion.  As far as they are concerned, 
EU’s focus on minorities in Turkey is nothing more than 
a European conspiracy aimed at breaking up Turkey 
into smaller units—a revamped Treaty of Sevres!
Support for Turkey’s membership among EU citizens 
is also quite low. According to a special Eurobarometer 
on enlargement (no. 255), a majority of Europeans inter-
viewed (52%) saw the accession of Turkey as mainly in 
Turkish interests, while only 20% saw a mutual interest 
for both the EU and Turkey.5  The strongest opposition 
was observed in Austria (81%), Germany (69%) and in 
Luxemburg (69%), Cyprus (68%) and Greece (67%). 
Behind such negativity lies public and officials’ preju-
dice against Turks as well as implications of Turkey’s 
membership for the EU institutions and budget.  Not 
only would Turkey have the largest population in the 
EU, its entry would require drastic reformulation of the 
allocation of seats in the EU parliament and of votes in 
the Council of Ministers. Potential economic costs of 
Turkish accession also raises objections.  As the poor-
est member of the EU, Turkey would seriously alter the 
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size and distribution of the Cohesion Funds that the 
EU spends on its poorer regions. Under current rules, 
given Turkey’s size and relative poverty, its accession 
would add €36.7 – 40.9 billion to the EU budget during 
2015-2017 in 1999 prices. Taking into consideration 
Turkey’s own likely contribution to the EU budget during 
the same time, the net receipts by Turkey would likely 
be between €25 and 27 billion.6
Final Thoughts
There are many reasons one could present in favor 
or against Turkey’s membership in the EU.  Recent 
developments have fueled negative feelings on both 
sides and strengthened the hands of those who are 
opposed to membership.  In my view, however, the 
consequences of shutting the door on Turkey would be 
devastating for all concerned.  Such a decision would 
eliminate all the positive benefits noted above with 
unpredictable consequences.  It would force Turks to 
look elsewhere for a “new alliance,” further destabilize 
Greek-Turkish relations, and unfortunately, give credit 
to the notion of a “clash of civilizations.”
Birol Yeşilada is Professor of Political Science, Urban 
& Public Affairs at Portland State University.
Endnotes
1  Radikal (Turkish Daily) “Fransa suyunu 
çıkardı” December 12, 2007, p.1.
2 European Commission, 2002 Regular Report 
on Turkey’s Progress Toward Accession (Brussels: 
Commission of the European Communities, 20020, p. 
55.
3  International Crisis Group, Turkey and Eu-
rope: The Way Ahead, Europe Report No. 184 (Istan-
bul and Brussels: ICG, 17 August 2007), p.6.
4  According to a study by Yesilada, Efird and 
Noordijk (2006) the EU’s economic decline against 
China and the US is expected to continue into the 
mid-21st Century. Based on power transition analy-
sis, the authors argue that the EU can only recover 
economic competitiveness given entry of a large and 
dynamic economy like Turkey into the Union starting 
in 2020-2025.
5  European Commission, Special Eurobarom-
eter on Enlargement no. 255, p. 69.
6  A.M. Lejour, R.A. de Mooij, and C.H. Capel 
“Assessing the economic implications of Turkish 
accession to the EU,” ECP Document no. 56 (Neth-
erlands: Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis, 2004).
Virtuous and Vicious Cycles in 
European Views of Turkey 
Hugh Pope
the golden era after 1999, in which EU-Turkish affairs 
moved in a virtuous circle of European encouragement 
and Turkish reform, culminated in the opening of Tur-
key’s negotiations to join the European Union in 2005. 
Since then, however, the relationship has stalled amid 
mutual recriminations. The main actors in this new vi-
cious circle have been leaders from the more powerful 
side, the European Union, just as it was a change of 
heart in Europe that encouraged Turkey’s strong prog-
ress towards accession. 
This new wave of hostility flared up as Turkey con-
founded expectations and seemed to be coming within 
reach of EU membership. It began in 2002, when former 
French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing stated flatly 
that Turkey was “not a European country.” Political lead-
ers in Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and elsewhere 
followed suit. The substitution of the goal of “privileged 
partnership” for full membership—suggesting a reversal 
of an EU promise since 1963 of Turkey’s eventual right 
to join—was a key part of the Christian Democrat elec-
tion manifesto of German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 
2004. Opposition to Turkey’s EU membership became 
a major platform in Nicolas Sarkozy’s election as Presi-
dent of France in 2007. Since taking office, he has made 
his opposition to Turkish membership a defining theme 
of French and EU foreign policy. All in this group express 
beliefs that Turkey’s geography, culture or ethnicity are 
somehow un-European. 
Anti-Turkish leaders in Europe base their policies 
on polls showing low support within Europe for both 
enlargement in general (recently 46 per cent for and 
42 per cent against) and Turkey’s membership in par-
ticular (39 per cent for and 48 per cent against).1 The 
proportion is highest in old EU countries with large 
Turkish minorities, where the idea of Turkey conjures up 
the old cliché of unintegrated immigrants, not the real 
Turkey, with its fast-growing economy and the vibrant 
metropolis of Istanbul, the European Capital of Culture 
in 2010. Europeans believe enlargement has gone too 
fast for the EU institutions to cope with, even though 
recent research shows that the institutions are coping 
reasonably well with the near-doubling of the number 
of countries since 2004.2 
Using Turkey’s Muslim identity as an anti-accession 
argument is still taboo for European leaders, although 
not for Dutch politician Geert Wilders, who is seeking a 
ban on the Koran. Still, the Islamic factor weighs on the 
average European’s mind; 43 per cent of Europeans 
think Turkey’s 75 million Muslims would make the EU 
“too diverse.”3 Media commentaries viewed Turkey’s 
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decision not to help the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 
as an “Islamic” move rather than a “European” reflex. 
Debates on Turkey tend to focus on Turkey’s Muslim 
headscarves, while ignoring Istanbul’s emergence ar-
tistic and commercial center. There is an unspoken idea 
that Islam is the antithesis of a Christian European-ness, 
illustrated in European publishers’ hunger for books by 
Muslim women who turn against Islam. Some of this is 
because Europeans are angry about terrorist attacks 
originating in immigrant Muslim communities and are 
nervous about their little-known fellow countrymen. 
Coupled with the eastward growth of the EU into a much 
misunderstood Muslim country like Turkey, fears have 
grown about Europeans’ power to rule their own lives 
and fueled demands for power to be brought back from 
Brussels to national governments. 
Often overlooked as a factor confounding EU policy 
towards Turkey is the problem on the Mediterranean 
island of Cyprus. The competing claims of the Greek Cy-
priot majority and Turkish Cypriot minority, and the Turk-
ish troops protecting the latter since a 1974 invasion, 
have long constituted an intractable wedge between 
Turkey and Europe. A breakthrough came in 2004, when 
the virtuous circle with the EU brought an about-face 
in Turkish policy. Two-thirds of Turkish Cypriots then 
voted to accept a UN-mediated, US- and EU-backed 
compromise settlement known as the Annan Plan. But 
three quarters of the Greek Cypriots rejected it. Despite 
this slap in the face, the EU allowed the Greek Cypriot 
administration into the EU as representatives of the 
whole island; despite European and UN promises to 
end the legal isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, change 
has been slow to come.
The Cyprus problem is now spreading to many 
domains, and, behind the scenes it is hobbling the EU-
Turkey relationship. Greek Cypriots formally blocked 
the opening of eight of the 35 EU negotiating chapters 
with Turkey in 2006; France added its block to five in 
2007. Both countries have informally blocked several 
more chapters within the EU bureaucracy. In revenge, 
Turkey is blocking EU access to NATO assets, espe-
cially if there is Greek Cypriot involvement. This has 
meant NATO cannot protect EU police in Afghanistan 
and has set back planning for EU missions in Chad 
and Darfur. EU policy on Kosovo independence is also 
constrained by Greek Cypriot fears of a precedent that 
might benefit Turkish Cypriots. At the same time, the 
sense that the EU is now a pro-Greek Cypriot party to 
the Cyprus problem has angered Turkish public opinion 
and delegitimized the Turkish government’s calls to 
pursue domestic reforms for Europe’s sake. 
Seeing the growing threat, the European Com-
mission bureaucracy is leading efforts to revive the 
UN-mediated Cyprus settlement process in 2008. The 
situation has also provoked a broader new dynamic: 
the emergence of a European faction ready to stand up 
publicly against other Europeans in favor of Turkey’s EU 
membership. This group is led by Sweden’s Carl Bildt, 
Spain’s Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, Italy’s Massemo 
D’Alema and, since the departure of Tony Blair, Britain’s 
David Miliband. They tend to want a broader EU than 
the old Franco-German-dominated club. They also view 
the challenging facts about Turkish membership—the 
largest population in Europe within a decade, per capita 
income that is still one third of the EU average, and a raft 
of issues of poor governance—as transitional matters 
that will be solved by rising wealth and the 10-20 years’ 
time needed before Turkey can be ready to join. 
Still, this group’s support for Turkey has not yet be-
come part of a broad, coherent vision for the future of 
the EU’s southeastern flank. For instance, the impulse 
to counteract authoritarianism that was at the heart of 
the EU’s founding partnership between Germany and 
France, and which subsequently benefited Greece, 
Spain and Portugal and in the 1980s, fitted modern 
Turkey’s needs as well. But the EU lost stamina in 2005, 
just when the democratizing EU magic was beginning 
to work. 
On the other hand, the pro-Turkish faction did defeat 
France’s initiative for an expert commission to focus 
exclusively on defining a European geography that 
would exclude Turkey. Instead, the “reflection group” 
agreed in December 2007 under former Spanish Prime 
Minister Felipe Gonzalez could catalyze new thinking 
about Europe’s future in general. Its report, due in 
2010, may even find that Turkey’s Muslim identity and 
Middle Eastern influence are advantages for Europe, 
or see that a new generation of young Europeans are 
better wider at accepting differences and integration. 
Similarly, a new generation of European Muslims is 
now influenced by Turkey’s ruling AK Party’s pragmatic 
compromise between religious tradition and interna-
tional modernity. 
If Europe wants to dry up support for the sinister 
side of the dynamism of its Muslim communities, it 
has no choice but to take the lead in an embrace of a 
pluralistic European identity that can embrace its three 
per cent Muslim minority and other religions. A Europe 
that rejects Turkey’s EU process will undermine its goal 
of becoming a global actor. Along the way, continued 
work on Turkey’s membership—a process that will, after 
all, last another decade or two—can show Europe a 
way out of narrow definitions of “the West” and return 
to a more confident European idea that is more likely 
to sway opinions and promote European interests in its 
Middle Eastern back yard. 
Hugh Pope is a Senior Analyst at the International 
Crisis Group.
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Turkey and the European Union’s 
Political Conditionality 
Meltem Müftüler-Baç
when turkey began its accession negotiations with the 
European Union in October 2005, this created a re-
newed interest in understanding Turkey’s politics.  A 
question looming in many minds in assessing Turkey’s 
fit as an EU member was whether Turkey conforms 
to the basic principles of European democracy.   This 
concern is highly salient in spite of the European Com-
mission’s assessment in its 2004 Progress Report 
that “Turkey sufficiently fulfills the political aspects of 
the Copenhagen criteria’, based upon which Turkey’s 
accession negotiations were opened.  Though Turkey 
was deemed to meet the political criteria, there was still 
doubt in the minds of European officials, as underscored 
by the stipulation in the 2005 Negotiating Framework for 
that “In the case of a serious and persistent breach in 
Turkey on the principles of democracy…. the Commis-
sion will, on its own initiative or on the request of one 
third of the Member States, recommend the suspension 
of negotiations.”1   This essay rests on the proposition 
that Turkey’s accession to the EU ultimately depends 
on the consolidation of democracy in Turkey and ad-
dresses the adaptation process in Turkey to European 
political norms.    
Turkey is an interesting case study to assess the 
degree of the European Union’s political conditionality 
and its ability to induce political change through the car-
rot of membership.  This is partly because of Turkey’s 
incorporation into the European order since 1945 and 
its extensive ties to the EU.  Turkey became a member 
of the Council of Europe in 1948, OEEC in 1949 and 
NATO in 1952.  Its relationship with the EU dates back 
to 1963 when it became an associate member of the EC 
with an eye towards full membership.  Turkey applied 
for full membership in 1987, realized a Customs Union 
with the EU on industrial products in 1996, and became 
a candidate country for EU membership in 1999.  
Even though Turkey was an integral part of the Eu-
ropean order since 1945, its democracy did not meet 
West European standards as of the 1990s.  The Turkish 
political system suffered from restrictions on individual 
rights and freedoms, as well as an institutionalized role 
of the military in civilian politics.  A significant wave of 
political reforms began in Turkey by the end of 1990s 
and gained significant momentum in 2002.  The EU 
provided a major motive for these reforms as the 1993 
Copenhagen criteria tied Turkey’s candidacy and open-
ing of accession negotiations ultimately to its democratic 
credentials.  As a result, Turkey adopted a substantive 
Constitutional Amendment package in 1995 in order 
to fulfill its political obligations under the 1995 Cus-
toms Union agreement.  Similarly, Turkey underwent 
significant political reforms in 1998-1999 to qualify for 
candidacy, and then greatly accelerated reforms in the 
2002-2005 period to qualify for accession negotiations. 
Since the opening of accession negotiations, the pace 
of political reform is still on track, despite the backlash 
against it that I discuss below. Turkey’s leaders know 
full well that final accession to the EU will be determined 
by its democratic credentials in addition to its ability to 
adopt the EU acquis communataire.
The major political changes in Turkey since 1995 
range from legal to institutional restructuring.  At the 
same time, one could argue that there is an increased 
assimilation of rules and norms of liberal democracy in 
Turkey since 1999.  It is clear that these political reforms 
and the subsequent norm diffusion partly resulted from 
the EU’s political conditionality.2    For example, the 
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared 
that “the reforms would continue at a rapid pace and 
Turkey’s EU bid is a reconstruction process that is rais-
ing Turkey’s political, economic and social standards.”3 
One should note that the adaptation to EU rules is a 
costly process, as is almost any process of significant 
political reform.4    In addition, the reception of European 
norms by various segments in the Turkish society dur-
ing the negotiations process is particularly problematic. 
Thus, it comes as no surprise that the Turkish political 
adaptation process to the European Union’s political 
criteria created a backlash that is mainly nationalist in 
character.  
The Turkish political system and costs of change
Various Turkish governments since 1999 have en-
gaged in political reforms. Of these reforms, the most 
notable changes are the new Civic Code adopted in 
2001, abolition of the death penalty in August 2002, and 
the new Penal Code adopted in 2005.  The changes 
in the civil-military relationship were underway since 
1999 when the military’s ties to the civilian institutions 
were gradually removed.  A major constitutional pack-
age was adopted in May 2007 which allowed for the 
election of the Turkish President by popular vote.  In 
addition, a series of political reforms strengthened the 
Endnotes
1  “Public Opinion in the European Union First 
Results”, Eurobarometer 66, European Commission, 
December 2006.
2  Helen Wallace, “Adapting to Enlargement of 
the European Union: Institutional Practice since May 
2004”, Trans European Policy Studies Association, 16 
November 2007.
3  “Tomorrow’s Europe”, EU-wide Deliberative 
Poll, published 18 October 2007.
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cornerstones of democracy such as freedom of speech, 
association, and religion.   Since 2002, the Turkish 
government adopted at least 12 different Constitutional 
packages and around 400 different laws to adjust to the 
EU’s political criteria. These political changes aimed at 
effectively transforming the Turkish political system into 
a liberal democratic order.    
This transformation is not fully complete, however. 
The three main current political issues in Turkey show 
that the process of Europeanization has become the 
major fault line in domestic politics: the process of 
democratization (most notably freedom of speech and 
civil-military relations), gender equality, and the Kurdish 
issue.  The history of Turkish modernization since the 
early 19th century is one of a fierce struggle between the 
proponents and opponents of Europe. Deniz Baykal, the 
opposition leader from the Republican People’s Party, is 
unambiguous: “We approach the Turkish EU member-
ship with scepticism.”5   Thus, the Turkish accession 
to the EU should be analyzed and read through this 
cleavage, and the EU acts as a force on its own right 
to deepen and highlight this division in Turkish politics. 
Even though negotiations between Turkey and the EU 
evolve around the Turkish adoption of the EU acquis 
and laws in 35 different chapters, there is an equally 
important negotiations process going on within the Turk-
ish society itself, between the reformists and those who 
would like to keep the status-quo intact.  
One needs to note that even when Turkey adopts 
the changes in legislation in order to harmonize its laws 
to the EU standards, the society’s reception of these 
laws and norms might remain problematic.  In other 
words, political change has two important aspects: the 
adoption of legal political reforms and the society’s in-
ternalization of these changes. It seems that the second 
aspect is a gradual process of change, much harder to 
accomplish than legal harmonization.  
An important revelation with respect to the Turkish 
case is that it demonstrates that the EU becomes a 
credible influence only when it signals its intent and 
political resolve.  This is also similar to the EU’s impact 
on democratization in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The 1999 Helsinki decision and the opening of acces-
sion negotiations in 2005 were all the right steps in 
that regard.   However, when the internal disputes and 
debates within the EU over enlargement and Turkey’s 
accession are reflected onto Turkey, or when such 
leaders as Nicolas Sarkozy or Angela Merkel talk about 
‘privileged partnership’ rather than membership for Tur-
key, that rhetoric decreases the EU’s credibility in the 
Turkish eyes, thereby reducing its effectiveness as an 
anchor for political reforms.    Were the EU to present 
a clearer commitment, this would effectively strengthen 
the hands of the political reformers. Their position is 
challenged by the conservative forces at home which 
claim that Turkey is adopting political reforms in an 
attempt to adjust to the EU norms and fulfill the politi-
cal aspects of the accession criteria but the EU is not 
going to accept Turkey as a full member in any case. 
In this fashion, the EU becomes an additional player 
in Turkish politics.  
Meltem Müftüler-Baç is Professor of International 
Relations at Sabanci University.
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The Military and Democracy in Turkey
Şahin Alpay
turkey was declared a candidate for membership in 
the European Union in December 1999. The first 
Regular Report from the EU Commission on “Tur-
key’s Progress Towards Accession” (issued in No-
vember 1998, actually a year earlier than the country 
was officially declared a candidate state) provided a 
comprehensive survey of shortcomings Turkey had 
to overcome in order to fulfill the membership crite-
ria. The report mentioned “anomalies in the function-
ing of public authorities, human rights violations, and 
shortcomings in the treatment of minorities” as the 
main areas where reforms were deemed necessary. 
One of the “anomalies” emphasized was the politi-
cal role of the National Security Council (NSC), a con-
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stitutional body that brought together top ministers and 
military commanders with the president as the chair-
man. The Report stated that the Turkish constitution al-
lowed the Army to play through the NSC “a civil role and 
intervene in every area of political life”, and that the Army 
was “not subject to civil control and sometimes even 
appears to act without the government’s knowledge” 
contrary to the practice in the member states of the 
EU. It recommended that the civilian - military relations 
(CMR) in Turkey be brought in line with EU standards.
Following the reforms adopted by Turkey under 
two different governments between 2001 and 2004, 
the EU decided in October 2005 that Turkey had “suf-
ficiently” fulfilled the “political” criteria, and accession 
negotiations could start. Two years later the Prog-
ress Report of 2007 outlined the remaining major 
problems of CMR in Turkey: “The armed forces con-
tinued to exercise significant political influence. Se-
nior members of the armed forces have stepped up 
their public comments on domestic and foreign pol-
icy questions… The General Staff directly interfered 
with the April 2007 presidential election by publishing 
a memorandum on its website expressing concern 
at the alleged weakening of secularism in the coun-
try… Overall, no progress has been made in ensur-
ing full civilian supervisory functions over the military 
and parliamentary oversight of defence expenditure.”
As witnessed by the recent Progress Report, de-
spite reforms adopted between 2001-2004, which sig-
nificantly curbed the constitutional and legal basis of 
the military’s political role, establishing full civilian con-
trol over the military remains the greatest challenge 
to the consolidation of a liberal democracy in Turkey. 
There are historical and cultural factors that ex-
plain the continuing political role of the military. The 
Army is the oldest, strongest, and most trusted institu-
tion of the Turkish Republic. Public trust in the Army 
remains higher in Turkey than in any other democracy. 
The people’s respect and trust of the military does 
not, however, extend to support of direct military rule.
The military regards itself as the guardian of  Ke-
malism, the principles set by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, 
the founder of the Turkish Republic, which forms the 
official ideology of the Turkish state. Kemalism can 
be briefly defined as a rigorous commitment to legal 
secularism, state control of religion, territorial integrity, 
and cultural homogeneity based on the Turkish lan-
guage and culture. Adherence of the military corps to 
an authoritarian form of Kemalism is enhanced by its 
educational system, which also establishes the mili-
tary as a group largely apart from the rest of society.
While the Turkish officers regard the multi-party 
system as an integral element of democracy, they 
tend to see political parties as gatherings of undis-
ciplined individuals who subordinate national inter-
ests to personal or group interests (Karaosmanoglu 
1993, 27). The political culture of the Turkish military 
encourages an ambiguous attitude towards demo-
cratic politics. Officers believe in the legitimacy of 
democratic government, but regard the intervention of 
the military also legitimate when the Turkish state or 
Kemalist principles are in danger. On those grounds 
the military has intervened in the democratic process 
on five different occasions since the introduction of 
multi–party rule in 1950, each time in different ways.
The political role of the military acquired a constitu-
tional basis first in the wake of the military intervention 
of May 27, 1960, when a military junta toppled the first 
democratically elected government. The Constitution 
of 1961, drawn up by the military, institutionalised its 
political role by establishing the NSC. Originally de-
signed to serve as a platform for the military to voice 
its opinion on matters of national security, the NSC 
over time acquired broader powers through amend-
ments to the constitution. Article 35 of the Military In-
ternal Service Code adopted in 1961 gave the task 
of  “protecting and safeguarding the Turkish mother-
land and the Turkish Republic” to the military, thus 
providing the legal basis of the military interventions 
to follow. Laws passed in 1970 authorized the Chief 
of Staff to determine defense policy, the military bud-
get, weapons systems, production and procurement 
of arms, intelligence gathering, internal security and 
all promotions. The defence budget has never been 
subjected to parliamentary debate. It is seldom dis-
cussed and criticized in the media. There is in gen-
eral a cloud of secrecy surrounding military spending. 
On March 12, 1971, the top military command re-
sponded to a discovered coup plot by intervening not 
only to arrest the plotters, but also to force the elected 
government to resign, and the parliament to support a 
government composed of technocrats. Constitutional 
amendments of 1973 extended the powers of the NSC 
to make recommendations to the government. In Sep-
tember 12, 1980, in response to escalating violence be-
tween left and right wing extremist groups, the top mili-
tary command staged a full coup d’etat, closed down the 
parliament and banned all political parties. The consti-
tution of 1982, drawn up by the military regime in pow-
er between 1980 – 83, further enhanced the status of 
the NSC by stipulating that its recommendations were 
to be given priority consideration by the government. 
The NSC was entrusted with the defense of broadly 
and ambiguously defined “national security.” The mili-
tary was empowered through the NSC to set the limits 
to the policy–making powers of the civilian authority. 
These military interventions lasted for relative-
ly short periods, but on each occasion the military 
gained tutelary powers and exit guarantees (Ozbudun 
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2005, 105–116) that provided the military with what 
has been termed “political autonomy,” defined as the 
military’s “ability to go above and beyond the consti-
tutional authority of democratically elected govern-
ments.” The high degree of autonomy the Turkish mili-
tary enjoys in political, economic, and other spheres 
have led some observers to conclude that it is virtually 
“a state within the state” (Jung and Piccoli 2001, 96). 
Domestic violence between ultra rightist and left-
ist groups during the 1970s, the rising threat of Kurd-
ish separatism in the 1980s, and the growing electoral 
power of the Islamist movement in the 1990s gave rise 
to what may be called a “national security state” in Tur-
key. Ultimate power rested with the military or within 
a broader National Security Establishment obsessed 
with internal and external enemies intent on dismem-
bering the country. The military not only guaranteed 
the security of the state against internal and external 
enemies, but also had power to exert important influ-
ence over domestic and foreign policy. Any means that 
were useful to control or destroy enemies was justified. 
Public debate was limited through secrecy and intimi-
dation. Policies were defined in secret, and implement-
ed through covert channels and clandestine activities.
Throughout this story, the military also became 
an important actor also in the economy. The Army 
Mutual Assistance Association (OYAK), established 
in September 1961, supported by subsidies, legal 
privilages and tax exemptions, has since developed 
into one of the largest holdings in the country. It owns 
companies involved in industry, banking, insurance, 
retail trade, real estate development, and other ar-
eas. The Foundation for Strengthening the Turkish 
Armed Forces (TSKGV), established in 1987 for in-
vestments in defense industries, has become another 
economic pillar of the military (Parla 1998, 42–49).
According to Umit Cizre, the foremost scholar of 
CMR in Turkey, “The constitution of 1982 entrenched 
the military’s veto power in the political system to 
such an extent that it has made crude military inter-
vention into politics redundant” (Cizre-Sakallioglu 
1997, 153–154.)  The point was proved when on 
February 28, 1997, in an intervention that has been 
dubbed a “lite” or “post–modern” coup, the military 
launched a campaign supported by the mainstream 
media and civil society groups to force the resigna-
tion of the coalition government composed of Is-
lamist Welfare and center-right True Path parties.
The prospect of EU membership that opened up 
for Turkey in 1999, provided a very strong external dy-
namic for change, and united Turkish society on an 
unprecedented scale. Secularists and Islamists, lib-
erals and pro–Kurdish groups, all regarded eventual 
EU membership as the best guarantee against their 
adversaries. The capture of the leader of the Kurd-
ish separatist organization, the PKK which combined 
guerilla war and terrorism against Turkey, created a 
positive climate for EU reforms. The EU prospect, 
however, confronted the military with a dilemma: 
The overriding aim of  Atatürk’s reforms of the 1920s 
and 1930s was to transform Turkey into a modern, 
Western state. By 1999 that meant joining the EU. 
But membership required the radical reform of sev-
eral of the keystones of the Kemalist state, including 
the withdrawal of the military from the political arena, 
concessions which the military feared could eventu-
ally lead to the dismemberment of the country or es-
tablishment of an Islamist state (Jenkins 2001, 8).
Moreover, tensions between the civilian govern-
ment and the military increased with the coming to 
power of the former Islamist Justice and Develop-
ment Party (AKP) in the elections of November 2002. 
The military deeply distrusted AKP’s commitment to 
secularism, but still gave its support to the reforms for 
the sake of EU membership. The constitutional and 
legal reform packages prepared by the AKP govern-
ment introduced fundamental changes to the func-
tions and composition of the NSC, as well as to the 
conditions relating to the control of military expendi-
tures. The NSC was transformed into a consultative 
body with a 9 to 5 civilian majority. The secretariat of 
the NSC was no longer able to conduct national se-
curity investigations on its own. State assets utilised 
by the military were brought under the inspection of 
the Court of Auditors, and parliamentary control over 
military budgeting was enhanced (Aydın and Keyman 
2004, 19 – 22; Ozbudun and Yazici 2005, 32- 41).
Despite these reforms, however, Turkey remains 
far from establishing civilian democratic control over 
the military. Military interventions in the political pro-
cess have continued. When the ruling AKP decided to 
nominate Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul to the presi-
dency last April, the military made clear that it would 
not accept a president whose wife wears a headscarf 
by placing a declaration on the website of the Chief 
of Staff late on the night of April 27, 2007 (Posch: 22 
– 23). The declaration sent out as email was dubbed 
an “e–memorandum” by the media. The AKP did not 
give in to the pressures, and decided in early May to 
dissolve the parliament when a Constitutional Court 
decision rendered the presidential election impossible. 
Also in April 2007, the diary of a retired navy com-
mander between 2003 and 2005 was leaked to the 
weekly journal Nokta. It revealed that the top com-
manders of the Armed Forces had plotted two at-
tempts at a coup d’etat during 2004. The attempts, 
explained the diary, had failed because then-Chief of 
Staff General Hilmi Özkök and the majority of gener-
als were opposed. Right after publication of the story 
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a military court ordered the Nokta offices searched, 
and the editor of the weekly was soon indicted for 
defaming the retired admiral. The publisher, seem-
ingly under pressure from the military, discontinued 
the publication of the weekly (Posch 2007, 18–19).
Early elections held on July 22nd brought AKP back 
to power with 47 percent of the vote instead of the 34 
percent it received in the previous election, and Abdul-
lah Gül was elected 11th president of the republic in 
late August. Despite refusing to attend receptions in the 
presence of President Gül’s headscarved wife, military 
commanders seem to be adapting to the new condi-
tions in Turkish politics as defined by the landslide vic-
tory of the AKP against thinly veiled military opposition.
The opposition by the former Chief of Staff Gen. 
Özkök and most of the generals to the plans for a 
coup d’etat may be an indication of a significant bi-
furcation among the ranks of the military. On the one 
hand there seem to be those who are committed to 
the “tradition” of intervening in the democratic process 
when deemed necessary. On the other are those who 
are increasingly aware that military interventions have 
begun to backfire and damage the image and prestige 
of the military both domestically and internationally. 
It is difficult to advance predictions about the future 
of CMR in Turkey. Two excellent recent reports discuss 
the need for reforms necessary to bring CMR in Turkey 
in line with European standards (Cizre 2006; Faltas 
and Jansen 2006). It seems reasonable, however, to 
make the following observations. Military interventions 
so far display a trend of decreasing force and scope. 
If the trend  continues any further, Turkey is about to 
close the chapter of outright military interventions. 
This cautious optimism is based primarily on such 
factors as deepening integration with Europe, increas-
ing economic interdependence with the outside world, 
growing satisfaction of the electorate with the demo-
cratic regime, the Islamist movement’s ideological 
transformation to combine  cultural conservativism with 
an economically and politically liberal platform, shrink-
ing fears in society at large about an impending Islamist 
takeover, increasing hopes for a peaceful solution to the 
Kurdish problem, an ever stronger civil society, dimin-
ishing support for military interventions by a vibrant and 
diversified media, and—last but not least—US signals 
that it will no longer support military interventions, and 
EU conditionality pushing for normalization of CMR.
The pace of reforms slowed down and their imple-
mentation became uneven after 2004, when French 
and German leaders began to talk about offering Tur-
key “privileged partnership” instead of full membership 
in the EU, and the PKK resumed violence. Normaliza-
tion of CMR in Turkey may thus be said to depend 
primarily on the continuation of the EU accession 
process on the one hand, and putting an end to PKK 
violence by solution of the Kurdish problem on the 
other. While neither development is in any way guar-
anteed, this scenario allows for a cautious optimism. 
Şahin Alpay is Professor of Political Science at 
Bahcesehir University.
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on the integration in Latin America.  
Based on three scholars,4 we can observe at 
least sixteen variables that help to explain obstacles 
and steps forward of the integration process in Latin 
America.  In a seminal article published in the 1960s, 
Ernst Haas and Philippe Schmitter suggested nine 
variables that are more or less consistently present in 
integration processes: size of units, rate of transactions, 
extent of pluralism, elite complementarity, governmental 
purposes, power of union, decision-making style, rate 
of transactions and adaptability of governments.  More 
recently, Louise Fawcett considered pertinent three 
related issues to discuss contemporary regionalism: 
capacity, sovereignty and hegemony.  On the other 
hand, Kanishka Jayasuriya has outlined four central 
elements of a regional project governance: a stable 
set of international economic strategies, a distinctive 
set of governance structures which enables regional 
economic governance, a set of ideational constructs to 
make possible the regional governance and the defini-
tion of region, and a convergence of domestic coalitions 
and political economy structures across the region.5
The variety of variables taken into account reflects the 
complexity of the integration processes.  Many of them 
are interrelated and are more or less relevant depend-
ing on the specific case to be studied.  Some others 
are unrelated or less significant for specific cases. In 
this regard, in order to study the integration processes 
in Latin America, the sixteen variables, some of them 
overlapping, can grouped in four main areas: a) condi-
tions for the integration process, b) institutional regional 
structure, and c) commitment of the member states and 
d) the role of external actors. 
I
The conditions to set in motion the integration pro-
cess in Latin America are multiple. Haas and Schmit-
ter considered as background conditions the size of 
units, the rate of transactions, the extent of pluralism 
and elite complementarity.  While the size of the units 
was not a relevant condition in Latin America during 
the first stages of integration, the rate of transactions 
(intra-trade exchanges, for instance) has remained 
relatively low among the members of Central America 
and Andean Community, presenting some increments 
in the 1990s.  An important element present in this area 
is the condition of under-development in Latin America 
as an obstacle to perceive the strategy of integration as 
viable while other more urgent issues are prioritized in 
the domestic agendas. Although the region is the rich-
est in the developing world, it has also record levels of 
inequality, with 50% of wealth being concentrated in the 
hands of 10% of the population.6
EUSA Latin-America-Caribbean
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Latin American Integration in Comparative
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since the inception of the European integration process 
five decades ago, scholars have speculated whether or 
not the European Union (EU) experiment can be rep-
licated in other regions of the world.  The answer has 
varied and a diversity of nuances between the two ends 
of the aisle has appeared: skepticism and enthusiasm. 
Fortunately, both positions present powerful arguments 
in their explanations. On the one hand, it has been 
argued that the unique features of the EU have been 
an impediment to comparative analysis.1  In this light, 
the EU is different because of its supranational institu-
tions, the qualified majority system and its “governance 
without government, governance without money and 
governance without partisanship.”2  However, on the 
other hand, the mere existence of a variety of integration 
processes around the world and its permanent evolution 
have also encouraged scholars and decision makers to 
debate ideas and implement policies aiming to develop 
distinct types of regional integration models.   
The literature on comparative regionalization and 
integration is extensive but not enough to provide con-
vincing answers to the numerous questions as to the 
genesis, scope and future of the multiple integration 
process.  Some scholars have conducted research to 
understand the conditions that favor the formation of 
either supranational arrangements or intergovernmental 
projects; others have been seeking to explain the strik-
ing differences in the targets and contents of regional 
laws, while a third group of students has been con-
cerned with measuring and explaining the efficiency of 
integration models.3  The variety of perspectives makes 
clear that comparative regional integration studies is   a 
fertile research area and that there is a need to develop 
more systematic research.  
In the case of Latin America, the experience of re-
gionalization can be traced back to the 1960s.  However, 
the regional institutions created back then found some 
problems to fill the expectations of their constitutive 
charters. Throughout the past five decades, scholars 
have devoted attention to explaining the evolution of 
the regionalization of Latin America.  Several variables 
have been taken into account to explain why they inte-
grate and what the main obstacles and conditions are 
to deepen integration processes. In a brief review of the 
literature, it is possible to be aware of the vivid debate 
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More significant were the arrival of the free trade 
policies and the revamping of the idea of integration in 
the last decade of the 20th century. Against this back-
ground, MERCOSUR was created and the Central 
American and Andean processes underwent deep 
transformations in their fundamental treaties. As to the 
role of the elites who embraced the integration, Mattli 
states: “Dispassionate and pragmatic bureaucrats, the 
técnicos, were few and between. Group structure tended 
to be asymmetric, rendering difficult for the técnicos to 
constitute a homogenous class capable of engaging in 
symmetrical learning through joint decision-making.”7  In 
sum, the initial drive for the integration in Latin America 
did not penetrate and change the domestic institutions 
and the mindset of the elites in the region.
II
A second element to compare regional integration 
processes is the institutional structure. Under different 
perspectives, regional structures have been studied by 
prominent scholars in the field of comparative studies. 
For instance, in the 1960s, Haas and Schmitter divided 
the study of integration institutions in two different cate-
gories, namely, power of the union and decision-making 
style. In a more contemporary version, Jayasuriya has 
called them “a distinctive set of governance structures 
which enables regional economic governance.”8  What 
is common to the analysis is the emphasis on two dif-
ferent aspects of regional institutions: first, their formal 
legal structure and, second, their effectiveness to 
achieve their goals.   
As to the formal structure, there are plenty of simi-
larities between the EU and the Andean Community. 
Based on the Trujillo Protocol of 1996, the legislation 
in the current Andean Integration System is proposed 
by the Andean General Secretariat and is adopted by 
the Council of Ministers. The CAN legislation is directly 
applicable and prevails over national law and more than 
600 decisions have been adopted since 1969.  A differ-
ent case is MERCOSUR because the 1991 Asunción 
Treaty and the 1994 Ouro Preto set a highly intergov-
ernmental structure. Both the Common Market Council 
(the main decision-making body and responsible for 
overseeing compliance with the strategic objectives 
laid out in the treaties) and the Common Market Group 
(in charge of regulating the decisions adopted by the 
Council and managing the proper functioning of the 
integration process) are composed of representatives of 
the member states, while the Secretariat is essentially 
administrative.9 The Central American process is the 
least developed in formal institutional terms. The 1991 
Tegucigalpa Protocol constitutes the foundation of the 
Central American Integration System (SICA). While 
the economic subsystem is mainly intergovernmental, 
the region has found some problems with agreeing on 
the general institutional framework on issues such as 
unifying the different secretariats in a single Secretariat-
General or working towards a single legal instrument 
reviewing and rationalizing the statutes.
On the other hand, when the institutional structure 
is analyzed by pondering the effectiveness of the in-
stitutions, the dissimilarities between the EU and the 
Latin American processes dramatically augment. The 
assessment in this area can be made from two differ-
ent angles.  The first is by looking at the gap between 
the aims of the formal institutions and their problems 
to deliver.  MERCOSUR is an interesting case for the 
analysis. Since 2002, a number of milestones are 
worthy to underline: the upgrade of the Administrative 
Secretariat to a Technical Secretariat; the creation of 
the Commission of Permanent Representatives and 
the Permanent Review tribunal, and the establishment 
of the MERCOSUR Fund for Structural Convergence. 
Nonetheless, there are major hindrances in the per-
formance of the MERCOSUR institutions such as the 
incompleteness of the customs union, the limited scope 
of the common market, the frictions and the obstacles 
for the transposition of rules.  In the case of the CAN, 
the institutional performance is also limited, particularly 
in the case of the difficulties with adopting the common 
external tariff, the increasing infringements of CAN rules 
and a the proliferation of trade defense measures. As to 
the Central American integration process, a number of 
critical issues require attention: problems with coordina-
tion, follow-up execution and evaluation of presidential 
and ministerial decisions, the need to consolidate the 
legal base of the institutional set-up and to amend the 
statutes of the Court of Justice and the PARLACEN 
as well as the establishment of an automatic financing 
mechanism for regional institutions.10
The second perspective to asses the effectiveness 
of the institutions is by the way they boost interdepen-
dence among the members.  One of the most common 
indicators is the intra-regional trade growth. MERCO-
SUR’s intra-regional trade averaged 15% of the total 
over the period 2002-2005, a relatively low rate when 
compared with other regions such as the EU (65.9%) or 
NAFTA (43.3%).11 In the case of Central America, intra-
regional trade accounted for 27% of the total exports 
and 13% of the total imports. 
III
The third element in the analysis is related to the 
commitment of the members in the construction of the 
integration process.  Integration treaties only signify a 
promise by the leaders to engage in a particular course 
of action. It is implementation of those treaties which 
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translates the aspiration for better living standards into 
reality. 
In the attempt of comparing and assessing the in-
tegration processes, Haas and Schmitter pointed out 
the case of the adaptability of governmental actors to 
fulfill the commitments in the integration process,12 while 
Louise Fawcett highlighted the role of sovereignty and 
the constrains that imposes to the willingness of the 
states to cooperate and Jayasuriya presented the con-
vergence of domestic coalitions and political economy 
structures across the region.13 To some extent, these 
elements can be encapsulated into the willingness of 
the Latin American countries to move forward or slow 
down their integration processes.  There are several 
examples that reflect the weaknesses in this area. 
In the case of Central America, the effectiveness of 
the weak regional institutions is harmed by the fact that 
Costa Rica, Guatemala and Panama are not members 
of the Central American Court of Justice and Costa 
Rica is not member of the Parlacen.  As to the CAN, 
the region is aiming to a flexible definition of external 
tariffs, which both facilitates negotiations with non-CAN 
countries regions and is detrimental to the Common 
Tariff Policy. In this regard, Peru has opened up its 
market to the other member countries since 2006. In 
MERCOSUR there are also some problems as to the 
commitment with the integration process. Even the 
conceptualization of regionalization differs between 
Brazil and the rest of the partners and, consequently, 
the commitment of the member states to the integra-
tion process is undermined.  Nicola Phillips states that 
basically the interest of Brazil is tied principally to trade 
concerns and uses the unilateral bloc-driven liberaliza-
tion to propel reciprocal liberalization in other markets 
and other levels.  Conversely, the interests of the Ar-
gentine, Uruguayan and Paraguayan governments “are 
dictated by a broader set of developmental imperatives, 
of which the attraction of capital and the industrialization 
are foremost.”14  Likewise, the MERCOSUR member 
states transpose on average only 48% of the rules 
adopted by the bloc’s legislative bodies.
IV
The fourth category of issues makes reference to 
the role of external actors. The economic and political 
weight of the United States in the region influences the 
strategies of the integration mechanisms.  In the case 
of NAFTA, Mexico simply opted for deepening the in-
terdependence with the United States, and negotiated 
low-impact free trade agreements with most of the Latin 
American countries.  As to the Andean Community, the 
inability to reach a common strategy to negotiate a free 
trade agreement with the United States led to the indi-
vidual negotiations and the weakening of the regional 
institutions. This situation coincided with the announce-
ment of Venezuela to leave the Andean Community. 
In other words, as Louise Fawcett states: “All regional 
activity in the Americas, whether bandwagoning in 
NAFTA or balancing in MERCOSUR, is predicated on 
the dominant role of the United Sates.”15
Unlike the role of the United States, the EU has at-
tempted to play the role of catalyst in the Latin American 
integration.  Thus, the role of aid should not be ignored.16 
Even in the case of the European integration, the 
Marshall Plan indirectly set an environment conducive 
for the initial stages of the integration process.  In the 
case of Latin America, the EU has consistently provided 
incentives for regional integration. In the Regional 
Indicative Program 2007-2010, the EU has allocated 
25% of the budget to promote regional integration.17 
Even though the impact of EU aid to encourage the 
Latin American process is modest, more decisive ac-
tions coming from Europe may have a deeper effect 
such as the launch of negotiations for a comprehensive 
Association Agreement between both the EU/Andean 
Community of Nations and EU/Central America.
Conclusion
The elements mentioned above attempt to remind 
us of the relevance of comparative regional integration 
studies in Latin America.  The common denominator in 
the Latin American integration processes is that there is 
an urgent need to bridge the gap between the objectives 
predicated in legal frameworks and their implementa-
tion.  In this regard, there is still a myriad of unanswered 
questions surrounding the half full/half empty paradox of 
the Latin American integration, in which despite all the 
flaws there are also notable progress in some cases, 
particularly in the case of MERCOSUR.  From the cor-
ners of the scholars, the task is to continue revealing 
not only the patterns of success, but also launching 
the political imagination to adapt in other regions what 
worked in the EU and understanding that every integra-
tion process possesses both unique characteristics and 
commonalities with other regions.
Roberto Domínguez is Assistant Professor in the 
Government Department of Suffolk University.
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Assessing co-curricular simulations: A 
preliminary analysis of Eurosim 2008
Rebecca Jones
assessments of simulations both inside and outside of 
the classroom are designed to determine not only how 
well the simulation was carried out, but the pedagogical 
worthiness of the exercise.  Sociologists and teacher 
education faculty have long touted the idea of simula-
tions as valid tools for conveying information and life 
lessons in one package (Greenblat 1973; Szafran and 
Mandolini 1980; Dougherty 2003).  Greenblat (1973) 
and Szafran and Mandolini (1980) also discussed the 
idea of affective learning outcomes in simulations; stu-
dents are able to experience “real world” situations and 
gain an understanding of the stresses and pressures 
inherent in business and political processes.
Faculty members design and utilize simulations to 
achieve a number of goals.  Simulations are viewed as 
a unique, attention-holding method for delivering sub-
ject knowledge (e.g. facts, theories) in such a way that 
students will retain the information.  Secondly, simula-
tions are designed to motivate students to participate 
more in class.  Finally, simulations are seen as a way 
to show students through experience how institutional 
processes, such as making laws or implementing poli-
cies, function in their particular field of study.
The Eurosim simulation, run by the Trans-Atlantic 
Consortium for European Union Studies and Simula-
tions (TACEUSS) is designed to provide a hands-on 
introduction to students of the governing processes 
of the European Union (EU).  An initial round of sur-
veys was distributed at Eurosim 2007 which was held 
at Canisius College in Buffalo, New York.  A second 
round was distributed at Eurosim 2008 at the European 
Academy Otzenhausen in Germany.  Pre-simulation 
surveys, distributed at the opening banquet, asked 
students to conduct a self-assessment of their level 
of preparation as well as their opinion regarding their 
preparation relative to that of other participants.  In 
addition, students were asked to rate the simulation in 
terms of its usefulness to their future careers, ability to 
broaden their horizons, improve their negotiating and 
interpersonal skills, etc.  These aspects of simulations 
were identified by Greenblat (1973) and Szafran and 
Mandolini (1980) as necessary to improving the af-
fective learning of students and a primary benefit of 
participation in simulations. 
The results and analysis of the surveys from Eu-
rosim 2007 have been reported elsewhere and will 
appear in The Journal of Political Science Education 
in the fall of 2008.  This article will discuss the very 
preliminary results of the post-simulation surveys from 
Eurosim 2008.
Eurosim 2008 took place in Germany at the Eu-
ropean Academy in Otzenhausen.  22 schools and 
176 students from Europe and the United States 
participated.  The topic was CFSP/ESDP generally, 
with an emphasis on Kosovo and that province’s (at 
the time) pending independence.  The response rate 
to the post-simulation survey was low, only 42% (74 
students) completed the survey.  Of those responding, 
48.6% were U.S. students, and 44.6% were European 
students.  Women accounted for 52.7% of respondents 
and men for 40.5%; the average age was a little over 
21 years (21.43).  For 70.3% of the students, Eurosim 
2008 was their first experience participating in the 
simulation and among those who indicated they were 
not leaving school at the end of the Spring 2008 term, 
almost 49% (48.6%) plan on returning and participating 
again.  In terms of their introduction to the simulation, 
58.1% participated in Eurosim through a class on the 
EU, while 29.7% did so through a club.
The post-simulation surveys asked students for their 
overall assessment of the simulation, their assessment 
of their own level of preparation and knowledge of the 
topic area and their role as well as their evaluation of 
the performance of their peers and the strengths and 
weaknesses of the simulation.  Issues did arise with the 
return rate of both the pre- and post-simulation surveys. 
Students, both European and American, appeared to be 
“surveyed-out” and have no desire to respond any more 
than they were minimally required.  A number of stu-
dents only responded to those questions that required 
circling a one-to-five response; they either minimally, 
or not at all, filled in the open-ended questions.  Almost 
18% (17.6%) of the students did not answer the ques-
tion regarding the weakest element of the simulation, 
and 25.7% did not answer the question asking them to 
identify the strongest elements of the simulation.  While 
the importance of the survey in regards to their own and 
others future enjoyment of and learning experiences 
within the simulation are stressed, students appear to 
have little desire to fill in surveys.
Over all, 78.4% of the participants described their 
experience as “good” (36.5%) or “very good” (41.9%), 
while 12.2% described their overall experience as “ex-
cellent.”  About 65% (64.9%) felt that their experience 
at the simulation met or exceeded their expectations, 
however, just over one-quarter (25.7%) noted that the 
simulation either failed to meet their expectations (4.1%) 
or only met some expectations (21.6%).
Much of the literature discussing simulations fo-
cuses on cognitive learning outcomes (factual informa-
tion gained, the ability to apply concepts) rather than 
affective learning (see for example Ciliotta-Rubery 
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and Levy 2000; Galatas 2006; Zeff 2003).  In terms of 
gaining knowledge about the European Union, 78.3% 
agreed or strongly agreed that the simulation helped 
them to learn more about the EU.  90.6% felt that they 
were well-prepared for the topic and we can infer that 
they learned more about the situation in Kosovo and 
the European response to that issue than they might 
have otherwise.  In addition, 79.8% felt that they were 
adequately prepared for their role in the simulation.  This 
year, for the first time in a few years, a surprise crisis 
situation was inserted into the simulation.  Students 
were informed via news cast that a terrorist group in 
Kosovo had taken several EU representatives hostage 
and was demanding a ransom payment.  Subsequent 
broadcasts announced the murder of two of the hos-
tages and the fact that the whereabouts of the surviving 
hostages were unknown.  The crisis forced students 
to surface, so to speak, and adapt to a now rapidly 
changing situation; several mentioned in open-ended 
questions that they found the crisis to be one of the 
strongest elements of the simulation.
Affective learning includes elements such as im-
proved interpersonal skills, improved relationship be-
tween professor and students, an increased ability to 
put oneself in others’ place and appreciate the stresses 
and demands of a different job, more accurate self-
assessment, and improved levels of self-confidence 
(Greenblat 1973; Szafran and Mandolini 1980; Boud 
and Falchikov 1989).  Achievement of affective learning 
goals means that students have acquired or improved 
their ability to conduct a self-assessment of their own 
capabilities.  Several questions in the post-simulation 
survey were designed to address these areas.  When 
asked how they would change their own preparation 
for the simulation, 25.7% of the students felt that they 
had done an adequate job of preparation and would not 
change anything.  Just over half (51.4%) indicated that 
they would indeed change their preparation in some 
way.  Of those, 33.8% stated that they would engage 
in more research on the topic (18.9%), their particular 
role (8.1%), or more specific information (e.g. on par-
liamentary procedure) (6.8%).  
When it came to improving personal interaction 
skills and broadening their horizons, 48.7% said that 
they had gotten to know other students from their uni-
versity that they would not have met had it not been 
for the simulation.  63.5% felt that the simulation had 
broadened their horizons at their university and 68.9% 
agreed with the statement that the simulation would 
help them to deal with other new situations they would 
encounter in life.  54.1% indicated that the simulation 
had changed their perspective on how government 
works, and 73% said that they had gained a greater 
appreciation for the stresses and pressure faced by 
government officials.  Increased empathy for others 
and increased insight into the issues confronted by 
decision makers (Greenblat 1973) are signals that 
affective learning has taken place.  51.4% noted that 
the simulation had helped them learn to work better 
with their peers.  Each of these areas has long been 
considered a “side-effect” of simulations, but Greenblat 
(1973) and Szafran and Mandolini (1980) have argued 
that these types of interaction skills are in fact some of 
the stronger results to come from simulations.
In terms of their relationship with their professor, 
29.7% stated that they experienced no change in the 
relationship, with several stating that the relationship 
was good to begin with.  40.5% said that the relationship 
had changed for the better, while 10.8% indicated that 
they had experienced some change in the relationship. 
Again, an improved relationship between professors 
and students is viewed as one of the extra benefits 
of simulations, but not necessarily a goal.  Others 
(Greenblat 1973) have indicated that interacting with 
a professor outside of the classroom breaks down 
some of the hierarchical barriers that exist naturally in 
the relationship and that can become reinforced in the 
classroom setting.
The Eurosim simulation has multiple goals includ-
ing increasing knowledge of the institutions, functions, 
and policies of the EU, the role of the EU as an inter-
national actor, and introducing US students to Europe 
and European students to the United States.  The 
most frequent response to the question regarding the 
strongest element of the simulation was the opportunity 
to meet and work with students from other countries. 
18.9% of students noted the international atmosphere 
as the strongest element of the simulation.  Based on 
this preliminary analysis of the 2008 post-simulation 
survey, it appears that those goals are being achieved. 
Continued data collection will allow us to make a more 
precise determination of the impact of the simulation 
in terms of both fact-based knowledge and affective 
learning.
Consistent with assessment of earlier data, it does 
appear that simulations help students to gain affective 
learning as well as cognitive or factual knowledge. 
In addition, students mention that the opportunity to 
practice negotiating skills, meet new people both from 
their own university as well as from other countries, 
and improve or deepen their relationship with their 
professor are all welcome outcomes of participation in 
Eurosim.  More in-depth analysis of the data, as well as 
a comparison with the 2007 data will undoubtedly yield 
more nuanced results and allow us to further refine the 
surveys prior to distribution at Eurosim 2009.
Rebecca Jones is Assistant Professor of Government 
and Politics at Widener University.
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this book should be acclaimed by all scholars working 
on either the UN or the EU (or both) for at least two 
reasons: First, there are few published studies on the 
subject. Second, the ten contributors succeed in offering 
a quite comprehensive vision of EU-UN interactions at 
the beginning of the Twenty-First Century.
At the time of publication, both organizations are 
at a crossroads. The ratification of the Constitutional 
Treaty is still in process, the Common Foreign and Se-
curity Policy (CFSP) is more then ten-years old (even 
if the position of the High Representative remains rela-
tively weak: Javier Solana is cited only eight times in 
the book), the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) is still “work in process”, whereas EU external 
relations still focus predominately on trade and devel-
opment. On the other hand, the UN has gotten over 
the Iraqi Crisis but not the relative failure of its own 
reform (failings of the Security Council, the incomplete 
replacement of the Commission on Human Rights by 
the Human Rights Council), not to mention Kofi Annan’s 
bitterness at the end of his second term as Secretary 
General. As leaders of world (UN) and regional (EU) 
politics, both organizations have been in the front line of 
the global challenges of this century: collective security 
(chapter by Sven Biscop), economic and social issues 
(Paul Taylor), human rights (Karen E. Smith) and envi-
ronmental issues (Chad Damro), the latter being more 
convincing in his case study of the Kyoto Protocol than 
in the rest of a chapter which overlooks the power of 
EU directives like Natura 2000.
These global challenges take up a third of the book. 
The other two thirds are on theoretical questions: multi-
lateralism, diplomacy and negotiations (inside the EU, 
EU-UN and EU-other UN member states). The book 
certainly succeeds in presenting a pluralistic view on 
multilateralism and on the analysis of EU external action. 
In the conclusions, Knud Erik Jørgensen discusses the 
global governance perspective (Rosenau, Weiss), but 
also neo-realism (Grieco, Kagan), neo-institutionalism 
(Ruggie, Moravcsik) and constructivism (Finnemore, 
Wendt). On the other hand, some chapters adopt mainly 
a classical perspective by focusing on power politics: 
Christopher Hill on ‘The European Powers in the se-
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curity Council’; Katie Verlin Laatikainen on ‘Pushing 
Soft Power: Middle Power Diplomacy.’ Meanwhile the 
introduction emphasizes Keohane & Hoffmann’s con-
cept of ‘pooling and sharing of sovereignty’ to analyze 
the EU rather than a supranational, global governance 
approach. The editors themselves underline that ‘our 
contributors reveal how power continues to shape the 
progress and limits of EU diplomacy’ (p.21).
Overall, this book provides convincing evidence 
that ‘intersecting multilateralisms’ (EU and UN) benefit 
first the EU by favouring the integration of European 
foreign policies through convergence in votes at the 
UN General Assembly (chapter by Mary), a trend which 
includes newcomers from Central and Eastern Europe 
(Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués), and this even before 
they enter the EU. Consequently, the EU is able to rally 
a considerable number of votes (EU-25 represented 
13% of UN membership, EU-27 is 14%). Nevertheless, 
the authors underline the limits of this convergence: the 
EU remains a ‘political dwarf’ unable to challenge the 
United States power politics at the UN, and this despite 
the fact that, when taken together, EU member states 
are the largest financial contributors to the UN and hold 
two permanent seats on the Security Council.
Gilles Bertrand, SPIRIT-Sciences Po Bordeaux, 
University of Bordeaux
David Michael Green. The Europeans: Political Iden-
tity in an Emerging Polity. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2007.
the europeans seeks to examine the extent to which 
European identity exists, as well as to determine the 
content and depth of any European identity that is 
detected. The main underlying premise of the book is 
that the European integration project is more likely to be 
successful in the long run if it is supported by a strong 
affective element. Although many might contend that 
the project has, in fact, been remarkably successful 
despite low levels of European identity, Green argues 
that if the European Union ever faces ‘meaner times…a 
lack of diffuse support could very possibly result in rapid 
breakdown’ (p. 7). 
The book first provides a brief overview of the 
origins of the idea of European unification, then uses 
mass survey data to establish that a small minority of 
EU citizens (around 15%) identify very strongly with 
Europe, while another third feel at least a little bit Eu-
ropean some of the time. The real contribution of the 
book lies in the presentation of original data collected 
by the author. To supplement mass survey data on who 
‘the Europeans’ are, Green has conducted interviews 
with over 60 European elites (MEPs, business elites, 
think tank researchers, etc.) and obtained almost 300 
responses to a questionnaire targeting individuals who 
are expected to be strong European identifiers. The 
findings from these interviews and questionnaires are 
juxtaposed against the mass survey data and point to 
some interesting conclusions: ‘the Europeans’ are the 
more cosmopolitan, multi-lingual former participants in 
exchange programs like Erasmus and Socrates. The 
findings further indicate that being European is widely 
linked with the idea of peace, but some also associate it 
with shared culture, while others point to the economic 
benefits of being part of Europe. At least among Euro-
pean identifiers, Europe is also connected to respect 
for diversity, tolerance, and multiculturalism. 
It is difficult to draw promising conclusions about the 
future of European identity from Green’s analysis. The 
mass survey data indicate very little, if any, increase in 
European identity in the decades following the creation 
of the ECSC. Moreover, the results from the European 
Identifier Survey seem to point to the conclusion that 
European identification will continue to be limited to the 
handful of EU citizens who go on exchange programs, 
speak multiple languages, etc. Green’s response to this 
is that despite the thirty-odd years of survey data avail-
able, we still only have a snapshot of European identity 
and that European identity may develop in time.
Perhaps more important, though—according to 
Green—is the fact that the nature of identity is itself 
changing in the modern day. Factors such as reduced 
state capacity, along with multiculturalism and increased 
time for contemplation of identity, may be producing 
postmodern conceptualizations of identity having more 
to do with citizenship rights and less to do with ethnicity. 
In Green’s view, identity is becoming more connected 
to civic values than to ‘emotive’ (p. 159) primordial 
characteristics, and this is the likely basis of the future 
European identity. 
Overall, the book is well-written and provides a 
reasonably thorough assessment of European identity. 
The author could go further in exploring the dimensions 
of European identity (e.g., cultural and civic) and could 
also conduct an in-depth analysis of non-identifiers. 
However, the book does an admirable job of integrating 
mass survey data and the non-representative sample 
of European identifiers to develop a more holistic 
perspective of the nature of European identity than 
would have been possible with only one or the other of 
these resources. Still, the conclusions to the book as 
outlined above are rather speculative, with the author 
ultimately concluding that strong, widespread affective 
European identity may not be such a good thing after 
all and that the more modern ‘passionless identity’(p. 
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164) is probably preferable, given the past atrocities 
that have resulted from strongly emotive national identi-
ties. Whether passionless identity can help Europe to 
survive meaner times—the primary concern discussed 
in the introduction to the book—is, of course, another 
question.
Lauren McLaren, University of Nottingham
Jonas Tallberg. Leadership and Negotiation in the 
European Union. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006. 
jonas tallberg has produced a lucid and much-needed 
survey of the chairmanship role in EU governance. He 
systematically traces the functional, efficiency-based 
logic behind the delegation of presidency power re-
sources to member-states’ aversion to collective action 
problems inherent in multilateral negotiations, including 
clogged agendas, bargaining breakdowns, and incoher-
ent representation (interinstitutional and with the outside 
world). Theoretically and empirically, the book’s design 
offers a compelling account of three primary roles 
anchored in the modern EU presidency – as agenda 
manager, as compromise broker, and as an external 
representative. Each role is carefully process traced 
through a pair of case studies that yield an impressive 
body of evidence of presidency influence across a range 
of member-state presidencies, issue-areas, and formal 
decision rules. Tallberg also provides an historical ac-
count of how the office of EU presidency evolved to fill 
such roles. He considers where alternative explana-
tions might part company from his account, engages 
counterfactual reasoning to ask how outcomes might/
might not have differed, and concludes with a broader 
extension of his argument to other international settings 
(including the OSCE, WTO, and UN). 
There are three major contributions on offer here. 
First, his formal leadership theory anchored in rational 
choice institutionalism (RCI) offers a high precision 
model for understanding how EU presidencies engineer 
bargains and make the need for supranational actors 
like the Commission redundant. Second, he convinc-
ingly documents how the EU presidency is not just about 
securing efficient bargains; by design, it offers the chair 
a privileged position to push outcomes towards national 
preferences and even exploit for domestic gain (think 
France and the Nice Treaty). His cases are selected 
to show how the presidency acts as a rotating “power 
platform” to give governments privileged procedural 
and informational advantages and allow them to steer 
outcomes to their own advantage. Third, Tallberg’s 
theory of formal leadership and the functional, demand-
driven logic that it rests on can be usefully generalized 
to other multilateral contexts. If the power of the chair 
in multilateral settings is driven by the search for effi-
cient bargains, generally, the exact roles and privileged 
resources are “custom-fitted” in ways predicted by the 
RCI model. If European integration theory does not 
traditionally export well, Tallberg’s study is a noteworthy 
exception.
One shortcoming stems from a case selection ratio-
nale which seems to skew the balancing act which the 
EU presidency performs in favor of the “ego” and at the 
expense of the “alter.” Tallberg’s selection rationale for 
cases where the presidency has extreme preferences 
is clear enough. It has the benefit of a “least-likely” 
design to spotlight how the chair can steer results in a 
nationally-preferred direction. However, this comes at 
the cost of truncating a broader (and arguably, more 
“normal”) range of cases where the presidency does 
not hold such preferences and/or works to find collec-
tive, consensus-based solutions. Tallberg is upfront in 
acknowledging that this limits the generalizability of his 
findings (cf. 8, 215-16). But one suspects at times that 
there is a wider range of motivation by chairs than what 
is presented. One example is the Finnish Northern Di-
mension initiative which involved complex reputational 
considerations to avoid appearing too self-promotional. 
Viewed in isolation this sequence may fit RCI assump-
tions concerning reputation, but did Finland balance 
winning this pet project with “this is the right thing to do” 
efforts at finding consensus-based compromise in other 
policy areas? Tallberg notes the Finnish presidency 
“mainly focused on the existing European agenda, and 
on some occasions even sacrificed national interests if 
this could facilitate agreement” (93). This reader for one 
would like to have seen more attention to this type of 
evidence. In general, if presidencies push for outcomes 
they privately prefer in one area, might they soft pedal 
interests in others?
A related concern is that this book’s main alterna-
tive explanation, sociological institutionalism (SI), is 
only measured against a very narrow range of informal 
appropriateness standards in the EU chairmanship. In 
particular, his SI alternative assumes that the chair must 
act in neutral, impartial ways. This strikes me as a very 
narrow test of norm conformance. His cases repeatedly 
note how chairs “took no notice of the norm of the neu-
tral and impartial Presidency, let alone allowed this norm 
dictate its behavior” (110), or failed to be “determinate” 
of national behavior “forcing” governments to “abstain 
from actions that would serve national priorities” (140). 
This is a very limited understanding of how norms work. 
Collective norms in settings such as EU decision mak-
ing are conditioning, not determining on behavior. While 
he punctures the myth of the impartial chair, he does 
not really engage the SI argument that EU presidency 
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standards balance “power platform” resources with a 
broad range of expectations about the “right thing to 
do” while in that position and the legitimacy conferred 
on the position to show partiality in order to find collec-
tive solutions. Again, one wonders if a fuller account 
and range of cases would show a more conditional 
exercise of presidency power resources by EU govern-
ments. But overall, despite a design that succumbs to a 
‘searching for keys in the lamp light’ flavor at times, this 
richly documented, theoretically-driven account of the 
modern EU presidency is likely to become regarded as 
an authoritative and path-breaking study in the field of 
European studies and international relations theories 
of multilateral negotiation more generally. 
Jeffrey Lewis, Cleveland State University
Derek Beach and Colette Mazzucelli (eds.). Leader-
ship in the Big Bangs of European Integration. Basing-
stoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
derek beach and colette mazzucelli attempt to go beyond 
the either-or dichotomy of neo-functionalists and inter-
governmentalists by proposing “a theory that bridges 
the gap” (p. 2). Their “leadership model” is based on 
negotiation theory and rational choice institutionalism. 
They define leadership as “any action by one actor to 
guide or direct the behavior of other actors (be they the 
whole group or only a smaller coalition) toward a certain 
collective goal” (p. 6); the provision of leadership can be 
motivated not only by an interest in collective gains, but 
also by influencing outcomes for private gains (p. 2).
Since the EU treaty negotiations are highly com-
plex multilateral affairs, leadership can help in crafting 
“mutually acceptable and efficient” agreements (p. 
9). The authors list four categories of leadership re-
sources (material resources, informational resources, 
reputation and internal capacity). Two types of leader-
ship strategies have been of greatest relevance for 
EU treaty negotiations. Structural leadership is based 
upon material resources and involves threats or use of 
negative or positive sanctions (a definition which comes 
close to power). Instrumental leadership is provided 
through functions such as managing agendas, craft-
ing compromises, building coalitions and brokering 
deals (p. 17). The rest of the book has been grouped 
into two clusters: six chapters dealing with specific EU 
institutions and four focusing on individual or groups of 
member states.
Jonas Tallberg is one of the authors who analyze 
EU Presidencies. He assesses the behavior of French 
negotiators at the Nice IGC. Tallberg notices that “the 
French government paid little regard to norms of neutral-
ity and impartiality, specifically favored French national 
interests, … yet succeeded in crafting a compromise 
that eventually was accepted by all parties” (p. 36). 
Provision of leadership in international negotiations is 
seldom altruistic.
Three chapters deal with the leadership roles of 
the Council Secretariat, the Commission and the Eu-
ropean Parliament at treaty negotiations. Derek Beach 
maintains that the staff of the Council Secretariat can-
not compete with the Commission in their substantive 
knowledge on the working of the EU treaties; yet the 
Secretariat has “a breadth of knowledge conducting 
both daily EU negotiations and treaty reform and strong 
legal expertise” (p. 78). According to Andreas Maurer, 
constitutional reform takes place incrementally during 
the “valleys” of day-to-day EU politics and the European 
Parliament is an important actor here (p. 132). Four 
chapters deal with French-German leadership, Britain, 
Poland and the “big” versus “small” cleavage during 
the Convention.
The book edited by Beach and Mazzucelli is an im-
portant contribution both for its empirical and theoretical 
analysis of EU politics from the perspective of leader-
ship. The chapters on the (supposed) leadership roles 
of the EU institutions are commendable. I also found 
interesting the various references to small states; they 
cannot exercise “structural leadership”, but they can 
provide “instrumental leadership” at IGCs with their 
substantive expertise and knowledge of how to broker 
compromises (Mazzucelli, p. 41). 
The Reform Treaty clearly reduces the possibili-
ties for the smaller EU states to exercise leadership 
and influence EU decision making. The status of the 
Commission will probably be diminished as well. How 
far the “leadership model” of Beach/Mazzucelli and 
the “polycentric process” hypothesis used in the con-
tribution by Renaud Dehousse and Florence Deloche-
Gaudez will still be valid (beyond the influence of the 
big states), only the future will tell.
Paul Leif, Austrian Institute for International 
Affairs (OIIP)
Esra Lagro and Knud Erik Jorgsen (eds). Turkey and 
the European Union: Prospects for a Difficult Encounter. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
written by scholars from Turkey and EU countries, this 
book scrutinizes the political, economic and cultural 
aspects of Turkey’s accession to the EU. Candidate to 
the European Community since 1987, accepted as such 
in as recently as 2002, Turkey and the EU only began 
formal negotiations in December 2005 which may last 
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at least ten years. Whether Turkey can accede to the 
EU or not is a difficult and an unpredictable issue which 
is the underlying question of this book. The Turkey-EU 
relationship triggers passionate debates in Turkey and 
in Europe because it questions the aims of the Euro-
pean Union and because “Turkish accession is, first 
and foremost a challenge to our imaginations to rethink 
collective European identity” (K. Dyson, p.59). 
The first four chapters focus on the political side 
of Turkey’s accession and this because any candidate 
state has to comply with the whole acquis communau-
taire. All the authors recognise that although Turkey 
has made strong and successfull reforms to fulfil ‘the 
Copenhagen criteria’, its related democratization re-
quirements, as well as human rights reforms, there is 
still a great deal to be done. Significant problems still 
remain primarily with respect to freedom of expres-
sion, the judicial system (Art. 301 of the new Penal 
Code), freedom of association and the protection of 
minorities (Kurds, Alevis and non Muslim minorities). 
Indeed “Turkey’s European integration process since 
2000 has been a very effective, influential and system-
transforming framework underpinning democratic and 
legal reforms, as well as bringing about a very strong 
societal will and support for the reform process. In fact, 
as opposed to, and compared with, the 1990s, Turkey 
has recently accomplished a democratic reform process 
of a historic nature in a wide range of areas, from hu-
man rights to civilian-military relations” (E. F. Keyman, 
S. Düzgit, p.71). 
The economic dimension of the accession process 
is subsequently presented by two stimulating contribu-
tions which underline the ambiguities of the Turkish 
economy. On one hand, Turkey has already achieved 
remarkable macroeconomic stability by implementing 
a variety of structural reforms in the frameworks of the 
Custom Unions and after the terrible 2001 crisis. For 
E. Lagro, “It is possible to foresee that the Maastricht 
agenda will not be a main concern for Turkey’s acces-
sion in the absence of large and unexpected external 
events affecting the global economy” (p.103). On the 
other hand, an active industrial policy is presented as 
the sine qua non of the accession process (to catch 
up with existing member states but also to enhance 
development in Turkey). However, one may question 
whether industrial policy actually remains a tool of EU 
political economy.
Finally, the last chapters of the book address the 
social-cultural dimension of Turkey’s accession which 
remains the most controversial question. The contribu-
tors point out the importance of identity and cultural 
issues in Turkey-EU relationships, loaded as they are 
with strong preconceived ideas and stereotypes. For K. 
E. Jorgensen “the cultural factor has been introduced 
as a key nodal point in public and political discourse.” 
One of the factors concerning which provokes opposi-
tion to Turkey’s accession is that the great majority of 
Turks are Muslim, even though the state is secular. 
Ö. Eriş notes that: “in the highly turbulent security en-
vironment of post-11 September, as the only secular 
Muslim democracy anchored clearly to the west, Turkey 
represents an antithesis to religious fundamentalism 
movements in the Middle East, with the capacity to act 
as a bridge between the Western world and Islamic 
countries” (p.211). But the reluctance of some European 
states, the slowness of the membership process and 
the feeling of double European standards also gener-
ate some negative effects on Turkish polity and politics 
such as the rise of Euro-sceptical feelings in Turkish 
society. And the alternative of an unclear “privileged 
partnership” proposed by German and French leaders 
to replace full membership serves only to strengthen 
this misunderstanding (and seems unlikely to ever be 
accepted by Turkey). 
Ultimately, this book provides an interesting and 
relevant overview of the difficult relationship between 
Turkey and the EU. In clarifying the real challenges of 
the Turkey’s candidacy, it should help bring rational 
arguments to public and scholarly debate.
Jean-François Polo, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de 
Rennes, CRAPE-CNRS
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EUSA Law Interest Section Essay
Judicially  Crafted Federalism: EU and USA
Mary L. Volcansek
the designation “United States of America” appears to 
have been used for the first time in 1776, in the closing 
paragraph of the Declaration of Independence, and al-
most two centuries later, in 1948, Winston Churchill 
applied a similar assignation, “the United States of Eu-
rope,” to capture one vision of a future face for Western 
Europe. The first was a declaration, and the second, 
a statement of aspiration. As the European Commu-
nity (EC) evolved into the European Union (EU), many 
parallels between it and the United States have been 
offered.  In this essay I follow in that line by consider-
ing how federalism, as a concept and as a reality, has 
been molded in the hands of judges.  The trajectories 
of federalism may, however, explain more about how 
courts consolidate and wield their power than about 
center and periphery relations.  Even so, the evolution 
of federalism, which carries different connotations in 
Europe and the U.S., bears the fingerprints of judges. 
Several competing explanations are typically of-
fered to explain how or why court decisions that mold 
public policy are reached. The so-called legal argu-
ment follows some variation on mechanical juris-
prudence and rests on the premises that judges are 
objective and that the law is a closed logical system: 
Rules x Facts = Decision (Frank, 1949: 14).  The at-
titudinal model, on the other hand, relegates law qua 
law to the background and moves the judges’ policy 
preferences or ideologies to the foreground (Segal 
and Spaeth, 1993).  Strategic choice theory negates 
neither, but proposes that judges act strategically in 
their decisions to maximize their impact, whether on 
law or on policy, within their own court and in rela-
tion to other institutions (Epstein and Knight, 1998). 
Judges are most likely motivated by  some combina-
tion of all three, or, as Gibson suggested, decisions of 
judges are “a function of what they prefer to do, tem-
pered by what they think they ought to do, but con-
strained by what they perceive as feasible to do” (Gib-
son, 1983: 9).  Judicial decisions are, in other words, 
the result of preferences, legal parameters and the 
political and social environment.  The European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) and the U.S. Supreme Court are in-
stitutions composed of shifting personnel and linked 
to the past by a history of their own jurisprudence. 
I propose to trace how federalism has been crafted 
by judges, but also how judicial institutions evolve 
in relation to other institutions and political forces.
The confusion about the meaning and implications 
of federalism that exists today was also found in 1786. 
Indeed, much discussion in the early days of the Con-
stitutional Convention in Philadelphia was consumed 
by attempts to define precisely what was meant by a 
“federal” system, where the power that would reside 
within the constituent parts was significantly greater 
than local entities could claim under any centralized 
arrangement.  Indeed, long after the Constitutional 
Convention ended, James Madison was writing letters 
still attempting to explain how the proposed configura-
tion of political power could  aptly be described:  “Will 
you pardon me for pointing out an error of fact into 
which you have fallen, as others have done, by sup-
posing that the term national applied to the contem-
plated Government,” Madison began to Andrew Ste-
venson.  “The term was used, not in contradistinction 
to a limited, but to a federal government . . . .    And 
there being no technical or appropriate denomination 
applicable to the new and unique system, the term na-
tional was used, with a confidence that it would be not 
be taken in a wrong sense . . . .”  (Farrand, 1966: III, 
473).    In another letter, written to N.P. Trist in 1831, 
Madison may have touched upon the most distin-
guishing element of the new design,  that “the powers 
to be vested in the new Govt. were to operate as in a 
Natl. Govt. directly on the people and not as in the Old 
Confedcy. on the States only” (Farrand, 1966: III, 517).
In Europe in the nineteenth century, political will fa-
vored national systems, wherein power was consolidat-
ed centrally; only the Swiss confederation of 1848 devi-
ated from that tendency. Though national governments 
in Europe were the norm, federal ideas were prevalent 
in the early years of the twentieth century, particularly 
between the wars.  Jean Monnet and Altiero Spinelli 
were, during the 1940s and 1950s, clearly influenced 
by federalist ideas, and their inclination is evident in 
the treaties that founded the EU (Close, 2000: 45).
Both the U.S. Constitution and the early treaties 
on which the EC was based reflected a desire to cre-
ate something not quite centralized, but more than 
confederated.  And, as Elazar points out, the U.S. and 
the EU experienced almost reverse processes, since 
“European integration has tended to be seen as a val-
ued end in itself, often confusing means with ends” 
(Elazar, 2001: 32). Yet, the two federal systems have 
both experienced varying degrees of state autonomy 
versus centralized power in different eras. The U.S. 
Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) did not direct the course of federation alone,  for 
the executives, legislators, administrators and other 
judges at both state and central levels were also ac-
tive in channeling or limiting the extent of centraliza-
tion.  The judges, even so, set parameters and goals to 
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be attained; they provided the frame that demarcated 
what could and could not be painted on the canvases 
by actors at the national, supranational or state level.
The sagas of judicial intervention are by now 
well-known to students of U.S. constitutional de-
velopment and those of European integration, but 
usually one, not both, of those stories is told.  This 
essay links the two in order to discern both famil-
iar patterns and divergent tendencies in the forces 
driving each judicial expansion and contraction. 
Federalism and Integration
The greatest barrier to discussions of federalism 
is “a lack of conceptual clarity” (Wildavsky, 1967: vii). 
Madison was at pains to describe the original U.S. 
version, and European scholars and politicians have 
been equally challenged in their efforts to define what 
federal Europe is or is not.  Daniel Elazar provides 
what is the most generic and, therefore, least con-
troversial definition of federalism: “the mode of po-
litical organization that unites separate polities within 
an overarching political system by distributing power 
among general and constituent governments in a 
manner designed to protect the existence and author-
ity of both” (1984: 2).  That division of power drives 
negotiations and yet links the two competing entities.
The term “federalism” is nowhere to be found in the 
U.S. Constitution, but rather it is derived from a juxtapo-
sition of the enumeration of national powers in Articles 
I, II and III with the reserved powers of Amendment 
X, but tempered by the supremacy clause of Article 
VI.  The last of those provisions makes explicit that the 
national constitution and laws trump any other: “This 
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof  . . . shall be the su-
preme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution 
or Laws of an State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” 
In light of state rivalries and jealousies to preserve 
powers at the time of union, the inclusion of that state-
ment is striking, but subsequent history has proved it 
essential to the future of the polity.   The ratification 
process clarified that the goal of the system should be 
attainment of an equilibrium between the states and 
the national government, with some powers exercised 
concurrently and with a division of sovereignty between 
states and the national government (Federalist No. 32).
Some architects of the early efforts toward Euro-
pean federalism clearly had a model similar to that of 
the United States in mind, and Robert Schumann even 
referred to the Treaty of Paris that established the Eu-
ropean Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as a first 
step in “laying the foundation for a European federa-
tion” (Close, 2000: 107).  Because of the connotation 
that “federalism” in Europe carries, most proponents 
of the ECSC and the later European Community Trea-
ty in 1957 eschewed use of the term.  They chose in-
stead to speak of “integration,” of functional integration 
of economic sectors.  Indeed, the descriptors devised 
for the European experiment include “supranational,” 
“functional integration,” and “intergovernmental” (Ro-
samond, 2000).  “Federalism” is too politically charged 
and deemed simultaneously  convenient and dan-
gerous, ideological and analytical; it has become “an 
elastic and controversial concept in the politics of Eu-
ropean integration” (Rosamond, 2000: 24).  Indeed, 
the failed 2003 EU Constitutional Treaty settled on 
a novel description, “the principle of loyal coopera-
tion,” to regulate relations between the Union and the 
Member States.  The elasticity of the term federalism 
permits, nonetheless, the conclusion that a form of 
it has been crafted in Europe as well as in the U.S. 
The founders of the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity adopted, however, the nomenclature of “supra-
national” as early as  1949, and that term is found in 
the Treaty of Paris.  The key elements of a suprana-
tional institution include its independence from its con-
stituent parts, its authority to make decisions that bind 
its member states and its ability to act on both states 
and on individuals within states (Hay, 1966: 33-34).   Is 
a supranational body federal? Ernst Haas answered 
that “federal,” “central” and “supranational” could be 
treated as synonymous since all described “activities, 
organizations and loyalties transcending the existing 
nations, even though in a strict constitutional sense 
there are no clear ‘federal’ powers” (Haas, 1958: 9). 
He preferred to use “economic integration” instead to 
describe the first linking of six nations and the Europe-
an Community, and he defined it as nothing more elab-
orate than forging economic links among countries; he 
countenanced the possibility, though, of using integra-
tion in economic sectors as a vehicle for eventual politi-
cal integration. Thus, the EU and the USA each have a 
form of federalism, but the balance within each of these 
dual systems shifts and changes with new conditions.
On both sides of the Atlantic, the process of in-
tegration proceeded at different rates over time. The 
meaning of American federalism was not settled with 
constitutional ratification (O’Brien, 1997: 595), and the 
EU’s evolution has proved to be even more fluid as 
each new treaty attempts to remedy perceived flaws 
of earlier ones and accommodate new or anticipat-
ed conditions.  There have been clear similarities at 
least in the judicial blush that has colored each ver-
sion of federation.  The U.S. experience spans more 
than two centuries and the European one is only 
one-quarter that, but analogous tendencies, particu-
larly at the highest level of the courts, are discern-
ible in the directions and degrees of federalization.
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Foundational Era
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the 
European Court of Justice received any notable litiga-
tion in their earliest days and, indeed, were regarded 
as somewhat peripheral to the newly formed systems 
of governance.  Nonetheless, both seized opportuni-
ties to assert the primacy of their respective national or 
supranational entities over the constituent parts and, 
thereby, also to consolidate their own institutional place. 
Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) marked  the first foray of 
the Supreme Court into the field of federalism, and the 
Court first confronted the question of state sovereign-
ty: can a citizen of one state could sue another state? 
The Court said “yes.” This case is particularly relevant 
since it also highlights the limits of judicial power and 
how other institutions can prevail against judicial pro-
nouncements.  The Eleventh Amendment establishing 
state sovereign immunity was passed in 1798 spe-
cifically to reverse the result of the Chisholm case.
The Supreme Court decided a series of cases in 
the early nineteenth century that formed the founda-
tion for a strong central government thereafter.  Mar-
bury v. Madison (1803), McColloch v. Maryland (1819) 
and Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) constituted the three 
legs on which the U.S. national government could rest 
its authority.  The first firmly established the suprema-
cy of the Supreme Court and articulated the power of 
judicial review; the second declared the supremacy of 
the national constitution and national laws, when ap-
propriately enacted, over those of the states; and the 
third elaborated a comprehensive definition of com-
merce as “commercial intercourse between nations, 
and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulat-
ed by prescribing rules for carrying on that commerce” 
(Gibbons v. Ogden, 1824).  Thereby,  a far-reaching 
power was claimed for the national Congress to con-
trol economic transactions among the states and with 
foreign nations.  This trilogy of cases declared the 
supremacy of the national government, so long as it 
acted within its proper sphere, over that of the states.
The European Court of Justice chose to strike a 
similar centralizing theme in a quartet of cases early in 
its existence.  The U.S. Constitution had embodied the 
concept that distinguished it clearly from earlier con-
federations by providing that the national government 
could act directly on citizens and not merely on states. 
The term for that arrangement in European parlance 
would be “direct effect.”  Rejecting a literal reading of 
Article 12 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the ECJ gave 
an expansive interpretation in its 1963 decision in Van 
Gend en Loos and declared that “the Community . . . 
constitutes a new legal order of international law for 
the benefit of which the states have limited their sover-
eign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects 
of which comprise not only Member States but also 
their nationals” (Van Gend en Loos, 1963).  The ECJ 
further declared in Van Gend en Loos, that the treaties 
imposed obligations on individuals, but also simultane-
ously conferred rights upon them.  This has been hailed 
as the first step in the Court’s “constitutionalizing” the 
treaties.  The ECJ then expanded the reach of lower 
order Community laws to trump those of the Member 
States by allowing individuals to invoke the authority of 
Community norms in national courts (Costa v. E.N.E.L, 
1964) and providing for direct applicability of regulations 
and some directives (Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974). 
In a parallel to McCulloch v. Maryland, the ECJ 
also declared the supremacy of supranational law in 
Costa v. E.N.E.L.  The Court explained that, consis-
tent with the spirit of the treaties, Member States had 
through the treaties accepted “a permanent limitation 
of their sovereign rights” and thereby Community laws 
“take precedence in, the legal order applicable in the 
territory of each of the Member States [and] also pre-
clude the valid adoption of new national legislative 
measures to the extent to which they would be incom-
patible with Community provisions” (Costa v. E.N.E.L., 
1964).  The Court established, thereby, a ground for 
judicial review of domestic laws by national courts and 
in the 1977 Simmenthal case the power of judicial re-
view and the supremacy of the treaties were also ex-
tended to national constitutions (Dehousse, 1998: 43).
The U.S. case of Gibbons v. Ogden carved out 
what Europeans call the “positive commerce clause” 
by declaring the authority of the central government to 
have sole authority to make regulations for interstate 
commerce.  The ERTA Case (Commission v. Coun-
cil, 1971) accomplished the same result in Europe by 
declaring that “when such common rules come into 
being, the Community alone” can act.  If there is posi-
tive commercial integration, then there remains the 
question of a “negative” commerce clause or integra-
tion.  In Europe, prohibitions on negatively affecting 
the free movement of goods derive from several treaty 
articles and prohibit tariffs, duties, discriminatory tax-
es and other barriers to intra-community/union trade.
The U.S. Supreme Court and the Court of Jus-
tice each managed, in the short interval of less than 
two decades, to assert that the constitution or trea-
ties were supreme over state or national laws, even 
state or national constitutions, and had direct effect 
on citizens, not just on states.  However, a significant 
difference did emerge.  The European treaties that 
formed “the constitution” of the EC or EU were largely 
restricted the economic issues, unlike the clear politi-
cal union in the U.S.  Hence, the EU has been said to 
possess an “economic constitution” (Maduro, 1998).
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Mutations of Jurisdictions
 Joseph Weiler labeled the second era of Europe-
an integration one of “mutation of jurisdiction and com-
petencies” (1999: 39), which also aptly describes the 
second phase of American federal evolution.  There 
are a number of constitutional provisions that served 
as vehicles for the Supreme Court, but this discussion 
will rely only on commerce clause interpretations.  Near 
the end of the nineteenth century, the United States 
entered an era that was more attuned to the rights or 
prerogatives of states, but the twentieth century wit-
nessed a distinct mutation that altered jurisdictions 
and competencies.  Extreme assertions of state pow-
ers were laid to rest by the Civil War of the 1860s, but 
the balance between the authority of the national gov-
ernment and that of the states still tilted toward the lat-
ter.  The period from  1895 to 1937 in the United States 
has been labeled “dual federalism,” which describes a 
situation in which states and the national governments 
had distinct jurisdictions and possibly even antagonistic 
interests; each was viewed as supreme within its own 
sphere, without overlapping or cooperative competen-
cies.  The national government first tested the limit 
of the commerce clause during this era and discov-
ered that the Supreme Court was inclined to read the 
constitution rather narrowly and, indeed, to step back 
from the sweeping field defined in Gibbons v. Ogden. 
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act, passed in 1890 
under the guise of the commerce clause, was de-
signed to break up collusive or monopolistic concen-
trations.  The Supreme Court read the commerce 
clause in the E.C. Knight case (1895) as incapable 
of extending congressional power to regulate manu-
facturing, mining, agriculture or any form of produc-
tion, activities that were said to precede commerce. 
The Court similarly prevented Congress from using 
the commerce clause to establish “unreasonable” 
regulations (Standard Oil v. U.S., 1911 and U.S. v. 
American Tobacco, 1911) or to prohibit products man-
ufactured with the use of child labor from entering 
interstate commerce (Hammer v. Dagenhart, 1918). 
While the U.S. Supreme Court was narrowly defin-
ing the national government’s power to regulate com-
mercial enterprises through the commerce clause, 
it was interestingly upholding use of the commerce 
clause to promote social policies.  Central government 
legislation to prohibit interstate transportation of lottery 
tickets (Champion v. Ames, 1903), stolen automobiles 
(Brooks v. U.S., 1925), impure food and drugs (Hip-
polite Egg Co. V. U.S., 1911) and women for immoral 
purposes (Hoke v. U.S., 1913) were, during the same 
period, validated by the Supreme Court as legitimate 
applications of the commerce clause.  The Supreme 
Court’s treatment of national and state relations dur-
ing the era of dual federalism was, in other words, not 
wholly unidirectional.  Only when laissez faire economic 
theories were offended by national government inter-
ference did the Court rebuke the central government.
In the 1930’s the Supreme Court even more dra-
matically interpreted the central government’s power 
under the commerce clause as strictly limited. Whole 
sectors of New Deal legislation were declared uncon-
stitutional as exceeding the powers authorized by the 
constitution.  The National Industrial Recovery Act 
that aimed at controlling detrimental competition was 
declared unconstitutional in part in Panama Refin-
ing Co. v. Ryan (1935) and Schechter Poultry Corp. 
v. U.S. (1935), because the elements being regu-
lated were not, according to the Court, part of com-
merce.  Similarly, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1933 was found to regulate agriculture and was, in 
line with the earlier E.C. Knight case, not commerce 
(U.S. v. Butler, 1936); the Bituminous Coal Conserva-
tion Act was invalidated in Carter v. Carter Coal Com-
pany (1936) using the same logic.  The Court read 
the commerce clause and, hence, the extent of na-
tional power, as limited to interstate transactions and 
placed the power to regulate so-called local activities 
squarely within the prerogative of the individual states.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s treatment of centralized 
authority over commerce was out of sync with both the 
president and Congress, but then it mutated again and 
redefined central and state competencies. Leaving 
the earlier restrictive interpretation behind, the Court 
broadly enunciated the extent of national government 
authority under the commerce clause from 1937 until 
the mid-1990s. Beginning with the decision in Nation-
al Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
(1937), the Court for almost sixty years  rarely encoun-
tered an assertion of a congressional power to regulate 
via the commerce clause that was not constitutional. 
Though the issue in Jones & Laughlin revolved around 
manufacturing, the Court found that Congress was 
within its authority to regulate it; manufacturing was 
no longer an antecedent to commerce, but part of it. 
Shortly thereafter, the Court also upheld an application 
of the commerce clause to establish a minimum wage 
(U.S. v. Darby, 1941) and explicitly over-ruled its ear-
lier decision in Hammer v.Daggenhart.  By 1942, the 
Court was willing to uphold the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act’s application of agricultural quotas to products that 
were intended for use on the farmer’s own property 
because “home-grown wheat in this sense competes 
with wheat in commerce” (Wickard v. Filburn, 1942).
Congress turned its use of the commerce clause 
to tackle policies that were only tangentially com-
mercial, most notably racial discrimination, and the 
Court upheld those applications, as well.  The 1964 
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Civil Rights Act was deemed a constitutional use of 
the commerce power (Heart of Atlanta Hotel v. U.S., 
1964) and was held to be appropriately applied to 
restaurants that did not market to people traveling 
in interstate commerce, but had purchased food that 
had been imported from out-of-state (Katzenback v. 
McClung, 1964).  This logic also permitted the Civil 
Rights Act to reach a resort in a remote location in 
Arkansas where some of the food sold, the records on 
the jukebox and the paddleboats had been purchased 
from out of state (Daniel v. Paul, 1969).  Using such 
broad, judicially sanctioned definitions of interstate 
commerce, Congress’s power to regulate recognized 
almost no bounds and was even extended to what 
state governments could pay their employees (Garcia 
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 1985). 
The second phase defining center-periphery rela-
tions in Europe commenced in 1973 and ran until 1992. 
The European Court of Justice was no longer making 
revolutionary changes in how member states related to 
the supranational structure, but rather clarifying, usually 
to the benefit of the higher authority, what the relation-
ship would be.  A look at how the four freedoms--free 
movement of persons, good, services and capital-- were 
implemented in this time period illustrates the trend. 
 Free movement of goods was central to the found-
ing of each of the treaties, and the Court acted to lim-
it markedly what member states might do to restrict 
products from other member states.  In Procureur du 
Roi v. Benoit and Dassonville (1974) the Court issued 
sweeping limitations on how member states treated 
imports from fellow member states, by prohibiting all 
rules that were “capable of hindering, directly or indi-
rectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade” as 
equivalent to explicitly banned quantitative restrictions 
“or measures equivalent to quantitative restrictions.” 
That position was buttressed in the 1979 Cassis de 
Dijon case (Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolver-
waltung für Branntwein) in which the ECJ declared not 
only that the German legislation prescribing alcoholic 
content of spirits offered for sale was a trade barri-
er, but also introduced a new criterion: if a beverage 
could be sold in one member state, it could validly be 
sold in another.  Thus, the doctrine of mutual recog-
nition would, thereafter, guide intra-Community trade. 
Free movement of people was rendered less en-
cumbered by national restrictions by the 1975 case of 
Van Duyn v. Home Office, in which the U.K. refused 
entrance to a Dutch national immigrating to Britain for 
employment with a sect that the British government 
did not approve.  The Court stated, however, that a 
member state government has no discretion in im-
plementing any Community law and established the 
principle of direct effect.  At the same time the ECJ 
allowed that the British government could bar Van 
Duyn from entering on grounds of public policy.  The 
stricture against discrimination against non-nationals 
was held the next year to extend to organizations 
that were not governmental (Dona v. Mantero, 1976), 
so long as the reasons were economic in nature.
Free movement of services was bolstered by the 
ECJ’s assertion that even rules not overtly discrimina-
tory can, nonetheless, run afoul of the treaty provisions 
guaranteeing free movement of services.  In Van Bins-
bergen v. Bestuur Van de Bedrijfsvereniging (1975) 
the Court held that a member state cannot impose ad-
ditional requirements, in this case the requirement of 
habitual residence, on a non-national when there are 
no other special conditions under national law.  Finally, 
in the area of free movement of capital, the Court in 
Commission v. Germany (1987) invalidated a German 
requirement that non-German insurance companies 
maintain an establishment within the country as violat-
ing provisions on free movement of capital and freedom 
of establishment; simply having an office was sufficient.
Divergent Paths
 Weiler sees 1992 and the implementation of the 
Single Europe Act as heralding the most recent phase 
of development in the EU, though much of the activity 
was focused away from the ECJ (Weiler, 1999: 63). 
The U.S. Supreme Court in that same decade tacked 
to a new course  in defining national and state com-
petencies.  Both the ECJ and the U.S. Supreme Court 
began to focus on state sovereignty.  Weiler chose 
his demarcating year because in February, 1992, the 
Maastricht Treaty or Treaty of European Union (TEU) 
was signed; its stated intent was to move to a closer 
union. The treaty created two new “pillars” or  mecha-
nisms for implementing common policies on foreign 
and security and on police and judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters.   Both new pillars were explic-
itly intergovernmental, as opposed to supranational, 
and both were explicitly placed beyond the purview 
of the ECJ.  That was slightly modified to give the 
ECJ limited jurisdiction in police and criminal coop-
eration by the Amsterdam Treaty that went into ef-
fect in 1999 and again with the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. 
The TEU was read as an intentional rebuke to the 
Court of Justice and signaled that further integration 
would move through an intergovernmental arrange-
ment, without interference by the supranational or cen-
tral institutions.  The ECJ may have inferred those mo-
tives, but was seemingly undeterred as it approached 
questions of state sovereignty. Indeed, it made a deci-
sion in 1993 on state liability that shaved very close to 
what remained of national sovereignty.  In Francovich 
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and Bonifaci v. Italy (1993) the ECJ held that if a member 
state failed to meet its obligations under EU law and an 
injury was sustained, the member state could be held 
liable for compensation. That rule was elaborated in 
the 1996 joined cases of Brasserie du Pêcheur v. Ger-
many and Regina v. Factortame.  Both cases touched 
notable national interests; the former involved the Ger-
man law on purity of beer and the second, on British 
fishing regulations.  In the joined cases, the Court held 
that financial compensation could be sought from a 
national government if three conditions were met: the 
law in question intended to confer rights on individuals, 
the injury  was serious, and a direct causal link existed 
between the state’s action or inaction and the injury. 
Actual determination of damages and awards of repa-
rations were left to national courts.  These decisions 
removed a form sovereign immunity that had shielded 
national governments when EU law was involved.
As the ECJ entered the 21st century, the EU was 
transformed by the adoption of the euro and shortly 
thereafter by the accession of twelve new member 
states.  The move towards greater integration was 
blunted when the European Constitutional Treaty was 
killed by referenda in France and the Netherlands in 
2005 and further diluted as central European nations 
with uneven levels of economic development and 
commitments to democracy joined the union.  Even 
so, the Court retained, often bound by its own juris-
prudence, its pro-integration bent.  The ECJ struck 
down, for example, U.K. measures that limited non-
nationals from obtaining student maintenance loans 
as discriminatory (Queen ex parte Bidar v. Secre-
tary of State for Education and Skills, 2005) and U.K. 
corporate tax practices as hindering the freedom of 
establishment (Marks and Spencer, 2005),  while up-
holding the U.K.’s ban on marketing tobacco products 
as consistent with the EC directive on labeling of to-
bacco products (Swedish Match v. Secretary of State 
for Health, 2004).  The ECJ waded into criminal law, 
drawing on the “constitutional traditions common to 
the member states and . . . the guidelines supplied by 
international treaties” to block the application of ret-
roactive criminal penalties that would result from the 
application of an EEC directive (Berlusconi, Adelchi, 
dell’Utri and others, 2005) and foreign affairs by ruling 
against Ireland for seeking relief from the International 
Law of the Sea dispute settlement system instead of 
utilizing the EU mechanisms (Commission v. Ireland, 
2006).  It further upheld regulatory actions on electron-
ic communications (U.K. v. Parliament and Council, 
2006), food additives (U.K. v. Parliament and Council, 
2005), and biotechnology inventions (Netherlands v. 
Parliament and Council, 2001), while annulling a di-
rective on the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco 
products (Germany v. Parliament and Council, 2001).
Beginning in 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court was 
also hearing cases asserting sovereign immunity for 
American states, but moving in the opposite direc-
tion from its counterpart in Europe.  The first decision 
involving federalism in the United States was that of 
Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), and Amendment XI was 
passed to counter it, preventing national courts from 
entertaining law suits against a state.  In other words, 
the amendment guaranteed that a state cannot be 
sued without its consent. In the 1999 case of Alden 
v. Maine the U.S. Supreme Court held that state em-
ployees could not, under Amendment XI, sue their em-
ploying states under the national Fair Labor Standards 
Act.  The Court in 2000 similarly found that the U.S. 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act could not be 
applied to state governments, since Congress could 
not abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity (Kimel v. 
Florida, 2000), and the next year the Americans with 
Disabilities Act fell, with reference to state employ-
ees, to the same fate (Alabama v.Garrett, 2001).  In 
short, Amendment XI was erected as a barrier to ap-
plying otherwise valid national legislation to state gov-
ernments.  An exception to that rule was carved out 
in 2003, when the Court held that a state employee 
could sue the state for violating the Family Leave 
Act, because Congress did possess the power under 
Amendment XIV’s equal protection clause to remedy 
gender discrimination.  The equal protection clause, 
in effect, trumped state sovereign immunity (Nevada 
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 2003).
The Supreme Court also began to restrict  na-
tional reach under the commerce clause.  Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985) was 
mentioned earlier as having extended congressional 
authority under the commerce clause. Though Garcia 
has never been explicitly over-ruled, the Court has lim-
ited the the extent of congressional application of the 
commerce clause in recent years.  In New York v. U.S. 
(1992) the Low-Level Radioactive Water Policy Act of 
1980 was deemed an infringement on state authority 
as protected by Amendment X.  The Brady Handgun 
Violence Prevention Act required state law enforce-
ment agencies to conduct criminal background checks 
on people wanting to buy guns, but the Supreme Court 
held, in Printz v. U.S. and Mack v. U.S. (1997), that 
the federal government could not “command”  state 
officials to enforce a national regulatory mechanism. 
The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 was 
passed by Congress under its commerce authority, 
but the U.S. Supreme Court held in U.S. v. Morrison 
and Brzonkala v. Morrison (2000) that Congress ex-
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ceeded its commerce power when it provided a civil 
remedy for enforcement of the law.  That same year, 
the Court upheld congressional use of the commerce 
power to restrict states’ ability to disclose a person’s 
personal information from drivers license applica-
tions without the person’s consent (Reno v. Con-
don, 2000).  A California law legalizing marijuana for 
medical purposes fell to Congress’s power under the 
commerce clause to regulate controlled substances 
(Gonzalez v. Raich, 2005), but the same congressio-
nal act was not allowed to over-rule Oregon’s Death 
with Dignity Act (Gonzalez v. Oregon, 2006). The 
U.S. Supreme Court has, in other words, more re-
cently charted a course opposite to that of the ECJ, 
by rejecting most attempts by the central government 
authorities to infringe state sovereign immunity or 
to use the commerce clause too expansively. 
Judicial Decision Making
To understand what all of this says about the na-
ture of federalism in the U.S. and the EU and where 
each may be going, how and why judges made the 
decisions they did seems central.  That can best be 
approached by returning to Gibson’s three-pronged 
explanation for how judges decide cases: judicial 
preferences, legal policy constraints and external limi-
tations (1983: 9).  Judicial preferences usually con-
note ideological, political or policy predispositions 
that color how a judge views the law to be interpreted 
or applied.  These values or goals are usually rela-
tively consistent over time for each judge (Segal and 
Spaeth, 1993).  During the foundational period on 
both sides of the Atlantic, the judges were motivated 
by specific goals.  Both sets of judges were federal-
ists and, in the case of the United States, Federalist 
partisans.  The Marshall Court (1801-1836) defined 
the foundational era and consciously intended to cre-
ate “an effective national government endowed with 
vital substantive powers” (Schwartz, 1993: 45).  The 
judges on the ECJ were driven by market-building 
(Weiner, 2000: 320).    Moreover, during their foun-
dational periods, both courts were largely unencum-
bered by prior decisions and jurisprudence that might 
have limited their work; both were quite clearly writing 
on blank slates and painting the first judicial strokes on 
the canvases of constitutional and treaty provisions.
The feasibility of judicial efforts is determined by 
the goals of other institutions and the extent to which 
they are harmonious or antagonistic.  During the foun-
dational era in the U.S., the Federalist Party held only 
the Court at the national level, while hostile Jefferso-
nians controlled both the presidency and Congress. 
The Jeffersonians espoused limited government, an-
tithetical to the nationalizing goals of the Supreme 
Court.  Their displeasure with the direction of the Court 
led to the impeachment, but not conviction, of Justice 
Samuel Chase, which was clearly intended as a threat 
to the Court as a whole (Schwartz, 1993: 57-8).  The 
ECJ found, on the other hand, itself surrounded dur-
ing its foundational period with institutions sharing its 
goals.  Both the Commission and the Council joined 
the Court in its drive to build a market.  That permitted 
a concerted top-down constitutionalism (Shaw, 2000: 
301).  The U.S. Supreme Court and the European 
Court of Justice both also benefited from a political 
environment that embraced a respect for the rule or 
law and accepted that courts were cloaked in its man-
tle of legitimacy (McCloskey, 1960: 11).  Only rogue 
criticisms were lodged again the ECJ (e.g., Colin, 
1966; Rasmussen, 1986).  The darts flung at the U.S. 
Court were so clearly partisan as to be discounted.
The era of mutation of competencies was, for the 
ECJ, an easier time.  The Court was primarily putting 
muscle on a skeletal architecture that was already in 
place.  European integration was, as a whole, large-
ly stagnant during these years (Weiler, 1999: 39), 
but the Court encountered little resistence from oth-
er European institutions and was gaining support at 
the national level from domestic judges (Alter, 1997).
The U.S. Supreme Court was driven, from 1895 
to 1936, by a belief in the gospel of Adam Smith 
(Schwartz, 1993: 179) and was alternately in or out of 
step with the other political institutions.  That commit-
ment eroded, as is evident in the narrow votes with-
in the Court itself, and the Great Depression argued 
that it was a failed ideology.  The second election of 
F.D. Roosevelt and the bold presidential court-pack-
ing plan made clear that the Court was an institution 
antagonistic to all other political sectors.  The Court 
capitulated.  Sitting Justice Robert Jackson saw the 
“Court as poised between two worlds,” and “ the 
older world of laissez faire was recognized every-
where outside the court as dead” (Jackson, 1941: 85).
The two courts diverge, though, in the third cycle 
of their development of federalism.  The ECJ was re-
buked, if only mildly, by provisions of the Maastricht 
Treaty that explicitly denied the Court a hand in new 
initiatives.  Before concluding, however, that the ECJ 
was clinging to an isolated position when it encroached 
on national sovereignty and asserted that member 
states could be held financially liable for violations of 
EU law, another feature of the Maastricht Treaty should 
be noted.  Because of repeated difficulties in gaining 
member state compliance, the Commission was given 
the option to impose penalties when states refused to 
comply with decisions of the ECJ.  The Commission 
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first used this option in 1997, when it sought a financial 
penalty against a member nation sanctioned by the 
ECJ (Azzi, 2000: 64).  The Court was, perhaps, act-
ing in concert with the EU executive in assuring that 
supranational laws were not flaunted by recalcitrant 
states.  At the very least, the two sought the same goal.
Ideology is the most obvious explanation for the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s shift on some extensions of the 
commerce clause and on its position on state sover-
eign immunity.  Former Chief Justice William Rehnquist 
championed states’ rights, and his position gained 
support on the bench with the arrival of the first con-
servative majority since 1936.  That majority reflected 
the conservative movement in the U.S. prior to the 
1992 election and made a “definite changes in direc-
tion” in several lines of jurisprudence; all tilt to the right 
(Schwartz, 1993: 372).  There has been no tension 
between the Court and other institutions as a result of 
the federalism decisions, largely because lawmakers, 
politicians and the public are not particularly interested 
in the subject.  Federalism struck a chord in the U.S. 
during the drive for racial integration in the 1950s and 
1960s, but no longer garners votes or exacts tolls. 
 State sovereignty is still a political theme in Eu-
rope, but it is becoming progressively more muted.  It 
may, as it has in the U.S., lose most of its resonance. 
Placement of sovereignty remains a concern in allo-
cating legal competencies and assessing obligations 
and responsibilities and may emerge as more con-
troversial with the addition of the new member states 
from central Europe and implementation of the more 
modest Lisbon Treaty. George Berman asserted that 
courts should not have a major policing role in fed-
eralism, because their role is only to supervise the 
structure (Berman, 2001: 197), but courts have had 
and will continue to have a hand in crafting the shapes 
that federalism or supranationalism have assumed. 
What, though, has determined the directions of the 
courts?  Preferences or ideologies have been determi-
native in three eras in the U.S., but a reaction followed 
the foundational period, the 1895-1936 free market 
bent and, more recently, the very central-govern-
ment-friendly interpretation of the commerce clause. 
The reactions to the first and the last came through 
changes in Court personnel; the 1937 shift was in re-
sponse to a number of external political pressures. 
None can be attributed to strictly legal concerns.
On the European side of the equation, the direc-
tion of the Court has not altered significantly.  Once 
the foundational period constitutionalized the trea-
ties and began a centralizing course, that trajec-
tory has been generally maintained.  The intensity 
of the pace has varied, however, over time.  Since 
judicial votes are not recorded on the ECJ, attribut-
ing values or ideology at the individual judge level is 
impossible.  At the level of the Court, however, mar-
ket building and integration seem to be the overlying 
templates across three eras.  That has been possible 
because of the consistent complicity of the Commis-
sion, the Council and member state judges, even if 
the European Council and member states objected.
The history of the U.S. Supreme Court and nation-
al-state relations extends over two centuries.  Contrac-
tions and expansions could be anticipated as so much 
in the political and economic world have changed.  The 
EU has been propelled by centripetal force toward a 
more integrated, federal Europe.  As economies and 
politics change and as the fifteen became 27, the ECJ 
may also find its jurisprudence will be pulled by in the 
opposite direction by centrifugal forces.  The values 
of the judges, the positions of the other institutions, 
and the parameters of the law defined by earlier deci-
sions will forge that future.  The key to a working fed-
eral system, as James Madison explained two centu-
ries ago, is achieving and maintaining an equilibrium. 
Mary L. Volcansek is a professor of political science 
at Texas Christian University.
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(cont. from p.1) of innovations. Over the past decade, 
EUSA has introduced prizes for best dissertation, book, 
and conference paper, a prestigious life-time academic 
achievement award, pre-dissertation research grants, con-
ference grants for graduate students and junior scholars, 8 
interest sections, a listserve, and conference papers online. 
Preparations are underway for the biennial EUSA 
conference, April 23-25 2009, in Los Angeles, California. 
This will be EUSA’s 20th anniversary, and we are looking 
forward to a festive event in Marina del Rey. The Execu-
tive Committee will meet early April to select the program 
committee, redesign the paper & panel selection proce-
dure to deal with an ever increasing number of proposals, 
and add new features to the conference format, includ-
ing teacher workshops. If you have suggestions on the 
conference format, please email Amy Verdun (averdun@
uvic.ca); please send comments concerning the paper & 
panel selection to Frank Schimmelfennig (frank.schim-
melfennig@eup.gess.ethz.ch). Or email me on either 
matter. The conference will, as usual, be open to propos-
als from graduate students and non-traditional scholars, 
EUSA interest sections, EU centers, and practitioners in 
government, law, business, and across all disciplines. 
Contingent upon support from the European Commission, 
we will again offer travel grants for students and young 
scholars. We like to boast that the EUSA conference is a 
major—perhaps the major—intellectual event for Europe-
anists. As of mid-February, the EUSA paper website for 
the forthcoming Montreal conference received 108,000 
visits, including 37,700 paper downloads! Ten papers 
have been downloaded over 300 times, 23 over 200 times, 
and the average paper has been downloaded 138 times. 
We will soon be advertising competitions for best 
dissertation, best paper, and best book. In 2003 the 
Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies was set up; 
it subsidizes annually one or two pre-dissertation sum-
mer research grants. This year we received 50 applica-
tions from 10 countries. The demand is there, and we 
would like to do more. There is a link for donations on 
the EUSA website, and a place to designate a donation 
to the Haas fund on your membership renewal form. 
Remember: donations are tax deductible in the USA.
Last but not least, I’d like to thank Amy Verdun (Univer-
sity of Victoria) for her inspired work as Forum editor over 
the past two years. Amy organized features on the Danish 
Cartoon Controversy, EU migration and asylum, the Lisbon 
Agenda, a debate on “What is Science in EU Studies,” 
and a John Peterson interview with European Commis-
sion President Barroso—all of which can be downloaded 
from our website. Craig Parsons (University of Oregon) 
is taking over the torch, and his first forum features four 
contributions on Turkey and the EU in this issue. If you 
have ideas on the forum or other EUSA Review features, 
he would be glad to hear from you (cap@uoregon.edu). 
Liesbet Hooghe, UNC Chapel Hill and VU Amsterdam
32     Winter 2008   EUSA Review
European Union Archival Collection at the
University of Pittsburgh
Phil Wilkin
Introduction
historically, the most complete EU depository library 
in North America has always been at the Delegation 
of the European Commission to the US, Washing-
ton, DC. The Delegation library received a complete 
collection of public European Union official docu-
ments and publications from 1952 to 2007, includ-
ing many items not received by the 56 other de-
pository libraries in the US. The Delegation recently 
donated this entire collection to the University Li-
brary System (ULS), University of Pittsburgh.  This 
essay is a description of the contents this collection.
Nature of the Collection
This collection includes over 16,000,000 pages, 
and is comprised of three main physical segments:
• the “main” collection with a paper copy of most 
official publications, about 1,750 linear shelf feet.
• microfiche collections of sev-
eral series, some of which duplicate pa-
per documents, about 650 linear shelf feet.
• “research files”: these are folders of EU docu-
ments, such as COM and SEC documents, Europe-
an Parliament reports, Council of Ministers and Eu-
ropean Commission press releases, and individual 
pieces of legislation, filed according to subject.  The 
files also include clippings from non-EU publications 
like Agence Europe, European Reports, and Europe-
an and U.S. newspapers.  As a result of these files, 
patrons have access to nearly complete collections 
of these documents running from when the Com-
munity began publishing them until the late 1990s.
Some important points about this collection:
• this guide refers only to items which are physi-
cally a part of this archival collection.  In many cases, 
publication of paper documents has been discontin-
ued, and continuations are now in electronic format.
• nearly all documents in the collection pub-
lished since 1973 are in English; many earlier docu-
ments are in French, with a few in other languages..
• the focus here is on documents published before 
about 1995, because many post-1995 documents are on 
EU websites, and readers will be more familiar with them.
Strengths of the collection
Describing the strengths of this collection is not a 
simple task.  Several factors influence the quantity of 
materials available for specific time periods.  First, the 
existence of documents on a topic depends upon when 
the Community was given authority to act, and the re-
sponsibility of the EU over policy areas has grown over 
the years.  Second, the institutions play different roles in 
the legislative process and their powers have changed 
over time, particularly for the European Parliament. 
Third, more documents have been produced during 
periods of greater activity within the Community, hence 
there will be far more and a wider variety of documents 
available for the 1990s on than for the prior period.
The best way to describe this collection is to list and 
describe a range of representative titles in the policy 
areas.  Documents are divided into three major catego-
ries below: documents on general, not policy-specific, 
topics; documents containing information on subject 
or policy areas; and documents containing technical 
or scientific information which does not apply to sub-
ject or policy areas.  Within individual policy areas, 
documents are listed under three headings: serials; 
series; and individual documents.  Where appropriate, 
the number of items in a series and total pages are 
listed to provide a sense of both the quantity of materi-
als on the topic and the size of individual documents.
Documents of a General Nature
Major Community institutions have published 
documents which describe general activities and de-
velopments.  The European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity (1951-1967), which became part of the European 
Communities in 1967, produced a number of publi-
cations describing their institutional activities, among 
them: General Report on the Activities of the Com-
munity (1952-67, annual, 3,800 p.); ECSC Financial 
Report (1953-87, 1,750 p.); C.E.C.A. 1952-62: resul-
tats; limites; perspectives (1963, 650 p.); Annuaire/
Yearbook of the Consultative Committee of the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community (1955-79, 2,500 p.).
The Commission has always published the vast 
majority of all Community documents, despite the 
fact that some Commission working papers were not 
made public.  The Commission publishes the General 
Report on the Activities of the Community (1958-2004, 
annual, 18,000 p.).  Most Council of Ministers publi-
cations were never made public; this has changed 
in recent years.  The Council published the Review 
of the Council’s Work (1960-96, annual, in French 
until 1971, 12,000 p.) and the Guide to the Council 
(1974-1996, annual, 5,000 p., describing the compo-
sition and activities of the Council).  The European 
Court of Justice collection includes about 340,000 
total pages.  The Economic and Social Committee 
collection includes about 40,000 pages, including 
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its annual report on its activities (1973--, 3,000 p.).
Additional documents of a general nature in this 
collection: Bulletin of the EEC/EC/EU (1958-2005, 
17,000), a monthly report on the activities of the in-
stitutions; Bulletin mensuel d’information/Bulletin de 
la C.E.C.A.  (1956-67, 5,500 p.).  Reviews activities 
in nearly all policy areas with the European Coal and 
Steel Community; complete set of European Parlia-
ment working and session documents, reports, and 
debates from 1951-94.  (350,000 p.); entire run of the 
Official Journal, the gazette record of the Community, 
about 2,230,000 total pages; collection of speeches 
given from the 1950s through the 1990s by Com-
munity officials (17,000 p.); complete run of press 
releases from the 1950s to 1990s (150,000 p.); set 
of Eurobarometer public opinion surveys on a variety 
of topics.  (1974-2000, 38,000 p.); complete compi-
lation of the statistical publications of the European 
Coal and Steel Community and the Statistical Office 
of the European Union starting in 1958 (750,000 p.).
Documents on Subject or Policy Areas
Many Community policy areas are highly disciplin-
ary, and hence not easy to isolate from others, so I have 
used the policy headings used in the names of the Di-
rectorates-General of the European Commission.  The 
total number of pages listed below in this section is 
about 6,011,090, or about 38% of the total 16,000,000+ 
pages in the collection.  Just over 5,000,000 of these 
6.011,090 pages are the Foreign Trade Analytical 
Tables, listed in External Relations, External Trade 
below.  If one subtracts them from the 6,011,090 it 
leaves about 1,034,090 total pages listed below, or 
about 6% of the total collection.  This illustrates how 
much of the collection is NOT included in this essay.
Agriculture and Rural Development
The topic of agriculture was of primary impor-
tance to European leaders right after World War II be-
cause of food shortages.  When the Treaty of Rome 
established the Common Market, and also the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy, in 1958, widespread state 
intervention concerning production, price setting, 
marketing, and farm structures was a barrier to co-
operation.  So the Community focused on agricultural 
policy, and one of the results was the production of 
a large quantity of analysis and research in the field 
from the early years.  Even now, the CAP absorbs 
nearly 50% of EU budgetary expenditure, and over 
half of all EU regulations deal with agriculture.  The 
separate agriculture collection includes about 500,000 
total pages; about 237,350 pages are listed here.
Serials: the Community produced the following 
informational publications between 1963 and 1994 
which are either parts of the same series or closely 
related: Green Europe (1979-94, 1,825 p.); Newslet-
ter on the Common Agricultural Policy (1963-77, 3,600 
p.); Green Europe-Newsletter in Brief (1979-85, 875 
p.); Green Europe News Flash (1983-89).  (8,700 p.); 
The Agricultural Situation in the European Union-An-
nual Report.  (1975-present, 11,000 p,); Reports of the 
Scientific Committee for Food.  (1975-98, 3,500 p.); Fi-
nancial Report Concerning the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund.  (1974-97, 7,000 p.).
Series: Etudes - serie agriculture.  (1960-68, 28 
items, 4,250 p.).  Most titles in French.  Titles on top-
ics such as agricultural cooperation in the EEC, ag-
ricultural production, and agricultural research; Infor-
mations internes sur l’agriculture - etudes et rapports/
Information on agriculture.  (1964-84, 260 items, 
78,000 p.).  Topic coverage very similar to title just 
above; Conditions de production de l’agriculture - In-
formations internes.  (1961-64, eight items, 600 p.); 
Les structures agricoles dans la C.E.E., Informations 
interne.  (1962-64, 25 items, 3,500 p.); Common 
Market Farm Report.  (1963-71, 30 items, 240 p.); 
Marches agricoles/Agricultural Markets.  (1965-2001, 
660 items, 112,500 p.).   Mostly graphs and figures, si-
multaneous publication in Dutch, German, and Italian.
Individual documents:  Le plan Mansholt.  Memo-
randum sur la reforme de l’agriculture dans la Commu-
naute economique europeenne.  (1968, 530 p.); The 
Italian “enti di sviluppo agricolo” (Agricultural Develop-
ment Bodies) in the Structural Reform – Adjustment 
Problems and Prospects.  (1976, 250 p.); Projections 
for the Agricultural Sector – Forecasts of the Trends in 
Farm Structures and Factor Input in Agriculture in the 
EC.  Vol. 1 – Theoretical Basis and Analysis of Existing 
Studies; Vol. 2 – Analysis and Forecasts, Empirical Re-
sults – General Part; Vol. 3 – Analysis and Forecasts, 
Empirical Results – Report by Country.  (1979, 980 p.).
Budget
The  budget collection is relatively small com-
pared to other areas, including about 60,000 to-
tal pages; about 20,000 pages are listed here.
Serials: Rapport du Commissaire aux Comptes/
Auditor’s report for the year___.  (1957-76, 4,000 p.). 
Concerns the European Coal and Steel Community; 
Budget de la Communaute – Complement au 2e Rap-
port general sur l’activite des Communautes.  (1957-
69, 450 p.).  Concerns the European Coal and Steel 
Community; Community Budget: The Facts in Figures. 
(1988-99, 900 p.); Comptes de gestion et bilans finan-
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ciers afferent aux operations du budget de l’exercise. 
(1958-80, 47 items, 13,000 p.); Analyses of the Financial 
Management in Respect of the Revenue and Expendi-
ture of the European Communities.  (1976-80, 1,100 p.).
Individual items: Community Public Finance: The 
European Budget After the 1988 Reform.  (1989, 120 
p.); Survey of the Member State National Laws govern-
ing Vertical Distribution Agreements.  (1996, 110 p.).
Competition
Competition includes policy areas such as anti-
trust, competitiveness, mergers, and state aids.  The 
competition collection is relatively small because the 
Community did not place major emphasis on competi-
tion policy until the run-up to the Single Market.   The 
separate competition collection includes about 105,000 
total pages; about 69,000 pages are listed here.
Serials: Report on Competition Policy.  (1952-
2005, 9,000 p.); Report on the Community’s Anti-
dumping and Anti-subsidy Activities. (1983-96, 1,000 
p.); Monitoring of Steel Aid Cases.  (1994-2001, 800 
p.); Report…on the Application of the Community 
Rules for State Aid to the Coal Industry.  (1988-99, 
330 p.); Report…on the Implementation…of Com-
munity Rules for Aid to the Steel Industry.  (1981-
99, 300 p.); Survey of state aids.  (1989-98, 850 p.).
Series: Competition – approximation of legislation 
series.  (1970-80s, 40 items, 7,500 p.).  In English and 
French.  Studies focus on relative advantages of inte-
grated and fragmented markets; “Concentration stud-
ies” series.  (1970-74, 200 items, 50,000 p.).  Studies on 
concentration in various industries, various languages.
Individual documents: Competition Rules in the 
EEC and the ECSC Applicable to State Aids.  (1987, 
265 p.); Community Competition Policy in 1993.  (65 p.).
Economic and Financial Affairs
Economic and financial affairs have always been 
a major priority for the Community, hence the col-
lection is sizeable.  The separate economic and fi-
nancial affairs collection includes about 280,000 
total pages; about 133,500 pages are listed here.
Serials: European Economy.  (1979-2002, 60,000 
p.).  Includes analyses and statistics on both EU and 
member states; Results of the Business Surveys 
carried out among Managements in the Community. 
(1962-98, 29,000 p.).  Six per year, in six languages. 
Results of questionnaires completed by businesses 
on production, employment, investment, etc.; Annual 
report of the European Investment Bank.  (1958-97, 
4,600 p.); Report on the Activities of the Monetary 
Committee.  (1959-88, 900 p.); Graphs and Notes on 
the Economic Situation in the Community.  (1959-78, 
5,000 p.).  Monthly, non-English before 1970.  Descrip-
tion and statistics various aspects of economic situa-
tion; Economic Situation in the Community.  (1959-78, 
15,000 p.).  Description of economic situation with 
some statistics; Investment in the Community in ____ 
and its Financing.  (1956-2000, 5,600 p.); Annual 
Report from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament in the Borrowing and Lending 
activities of the Community.  (1976-2002, 1,500 p.).
Series: the EU frequently produces publications 
which, although published separately, are closely relat-
ed.  The Report on the Economic Situation in the Coun-
tries of the Community (1958, 610 p.), also in French, 
offers an “…initial general review of the economic 
structure of the Member States and of the trends which 
will determine their future development.”  This report 
was created by a Working Party, chaired by Pierre Uri, 
appointed by the Commission.  Etudes/Studies.  Eco-
nomic and Financial Series (1962-77, 23 items, 6,700 
p.), which focuses on member state economies, was 
produced to complement the Report on the Economic 
Situation…  In 1971, the Rapport sur la capacite con-
currentielle de la communaute europeenne (2 volumes, 
plus Annex, 1,100 p.) was produced as an additional 
follow-up to the Report on the Economic Situation…
Individual documents: The Instruments of Mon-
etary Policy in the Countries of the European Eco-
nomic Community.  (1962, 270 p.); Policy on the Bond 
Markets in the Countries of the EEC.  (1970, 210 p.); 
Premier programme de politique economique a moy-
en terme 1966-1970.  (1971, 180 p.).  Also Second 
programme de politique economique a moyen terme. 
(1971, 380 p.); Monetary Policy in the Countries of 
the European Economic Community.  Institutions 
and Instruments.  (1972, 440 p.).  Also, same title, 
Supplement, 1974.  (200 p.); Fifteen Years of Com-
munity Policy.  (1973, 80 p.); European Economic In-
tegration and Monetary Unification.  (1973, 320 p.); 
Report of the Study Group – “Problems of Inflation.” 
(1976, 130 p.).  Simultaneous publication in French 
and German; Study on the Possible Part played by 
certain Primary Non-employment Incomes in the Infla-
tionary Process in _____, 1974.  (10 items, 1,260 p.). 
Individual volumes on eight countries, two in French. 
Education and Culture
Only with the Maastricht Treaty did the Com-
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munity make comprehensive reference to how edu-
cation and training might make a significant con-
tribution to the Community, hence the education 
collection (by itself) is relatively small, about 54,000 
total pages, and about 11,940 pages are listed 
here.  Within Community parlance, education in-
cludes the field of vocational training; this includes 
about 150,000 pages; about 68,000 pages are list-
ed here.  The cultural policy collection is very small.
Education
Serials: Annual report on ERASMUS program. 
(1987-94, 350 p.).  Designed to encourage student 
and faculty exchange so as to deepen integration at 
a personal and professional level; Annual report on 
LINGUA program.  (1989-94, 300 p.).  Designed to 
promote improvement in foreign language compe-
tencies in the EU; Annual report on SOCRATES pro-
gram.  (1995-99, 250 p.).  Designed to improve the 
quality of education by encouraging closer coopera-
tion between educational institution; Annual report on 
TEMPUS program.  (1990-99, 500 p.).  Designed 
to promote educational change between Com-
munity and Central and East European Countries.
 
Series: Key Data on Education in the European 
Union.  Multi-volume.  (1994-2002, 1,000 p.); Stud-
ies/Education Series.  (1977-84, 13 items, 2,600 
p.).  Sample titles: The Children of Migrant Workers. 
(1977, 54 p.); Management Education in the Euro-
pean Community.  (1978, 70 p.); Academic Recogni-
tion of Diplomas in the European Community: Present 
State Prospects.  (1979,   75 p.); Documents series. 
(1980s, 16 items, 3,500 p.).  Sample titles; The Con-
dition of Service of Teachers in the European Com-
munity.  (1988, 160 p.); Literacy Training in Europe: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Most Effective and Inno-
vative Literacy Schemes being Implemented in Mem-
ber States by the Authorities and Private Agencies. 
(1985, 110 p.); Higher Education in the European 
Community: Study Abroad in the European Commu-
nity.  (1887, 220 p.); Document series on evaluation of 
the COMETT program.  (1988-89, four items, 1,340 p.).
  
Individual documents: Key Topics in Education.  2 
volumes, 2000.  Vol. 1: Financial Support for Students 
in Higher Education in Europe – Trends and Debates. 
Vol. 2: Financing and Management of Resources in 
Compulsory Education – Trends in National Policies. 
(2000, 650 p.); Structures of the Educational and Initial 
Training Systems in the European Union.  2nd,  (1995, 
465 p.); A Guide to Higher Education Systems and 
Qualifications in the EU and EEA Countries.  (1998, 
890 p.); Final Evaluation of the FORCE Programme. 
(1997, 290 p.); Quality Assurance in In-house Continu-
ing Training-Case Studies from Europe.  (1996, 220p.).
Vocational Training
Serials: Vocational Training: Bulletin for the 
European Centre for the Development of Vo-
cational Training.  Three per year, various lan-
guages.  (1974-2004, 100 items, 6,000 p.).
Series: Eight series on vocational training by Euro-
pean Centre for the Development of Vocational Train-
ing (CEDEFOP).  (1970-90s, 260 items, 61,500 p.).
Individual documents: The Evolution of Vo-
cational Training.  (1975, 155 p.); Comparative 
Study on the Rehabilitation of Handicapped Per-
sons of the Community.  3 vols.  (1975, 425 p.).
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities
This is the most multi-disciplinary of the Commu-
nity D-Gs, because it combines two areas which can 
be considered as separate: employment/labor market, 
and social affairs.  The field of occupational health 
could be included here, but I have placed it with Health 
and Consumer Protection.  Employment policy has 
been important to the Community since the 1950s, 
because it is so important for economic integration; 
here it includes areas such as employment & unem-
ployment, labour market, work structures, and working 
conditions.  The collection includes about 160,000 to-
tal pages; about 61,000 pages are listed here.  Social 
policy includes areas such as social exclusion, social 
protection, and social security.  The Community did 
not attempt to harmonize social policy as a separate 
area until the early 1970s, but there is much material 
in the collection before then and since because so-
cial policy has developed in areas related to economic 
integration.  The collection includes about 250,000 
pages; about 76,400 pages are listed here.  The 
equal opportunities collection includes about 20,000 
total pages; about 15,400 pages are listed here.
Employment Policy
Serials: Annual report by European Foundation for 
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 
1983--.  (1,750 p.); Employment in Europe.  Annual. 
(1987-2002, 4,300 p.); Trade Union News from the 
European Community. (1964-75, 700 p.); European 
Trade Union Information Bulletin.  (1985-98, 8,000 p.); 
Trade Union Information.  (1974-86, 12,000 p.); La-
bor in the European Community.  (1964-68, 400 pp.).
Series: Les problems de main-d’oeuvre dans 
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la Communaute  (1970s, 14 items, 2,500 p.); Notes 
d’information. Information syndicales et ouvrieres. 
(1964-68, 125 items, 18,000 p.); La libre circulation 
de la main-ouvriere et les marches du travail dans le 
CEE.  (1966-70, five items, 750 p.); “Program for re-
search and activities on the development of the labour 
market”, series.  (Most 1980s, 50 items, 12,000 p.).
Individual documents: L’evolution de l’emploi dans les 
etats membres, 1954-1958.  (1961, 290 p.); Thirty Years 
of Free Movement of Workers in Europe. (1998, 325 p.).
Social Policy
Serials: European Social Fund.  (1973-89, 
3,000p.); Report on Social Developments/Report 
on the Development of the Social and Economic 
Situation of the Community.  (1971-95, 5,500 p.); 
Tableaux comparatifs des regimes de securite so-
ciale applicable dans les Etats members des Com-
munautes europeennes/Comparative Tables of the 
Social Security Schemes in the Member States of 
the European Communities.  (1962-2004, 9,250 p.)
Series: Note d’information.  (1955-64, 80 items, 
6,000 p.); Series “Evenements sociaux dans la Com-
munaute.”.  Concerns the European Coal and Steel 
Community, contains sections on member states; 
Guides pour les travailleurs migrants.  (1960s, 14 
items, 600 pp.); Evolution et tendances de la securite 
sociale, 1959.  (Eight items, 2,500 p.); Compendium of 
Community Provisions on Social Security.  (1980-83, 
four items, 1,100 p.); Condition of work for women, 
series.  (Early 1970s, eight items, 1,550 p.); Etudes/
studies.  (Most 1970s, 50 items, 8,000 p.).  Social pol-
icy series.  Sample titles: The Organization, Financing 
and Cost of Health Care in the European Community. 
Problems and Prospects of Collecting Bargaining in 
the EEC Member States.  The Cost of Hospitalization; 
Micro-economic Approach to the Problems Involved. 
Pharmaceutical Consumption: Trends in Expenditure; 
Main Measures Taken and Underlying Objectives of 
Public Intervention in this Field.  L’information rela-
tive aux revenues et aux patrimonies dans les pays 
de la Communaute.  Les incidences economiques de 
la securite sociale; Documents series.  (Most 1980s, 
50 items, 9,000 p.).  Sample titles: The Social Aspects 
of Technological Developments Relating to the Euro-
pean Machine-tool Industry – Final Report.  Medicine: 
Statistics of Smoking in the Member States of the Eu-
ropean Community.  Linguistic Minorities in Countries 
Belonging to the European Community.  Les accords 
de technologie en Belgique.  The Specific Training 
Needs of Immigrant Women: Existing and Recom-
mended Measures to fulfill Them.  The Re-insertion 
of Women in Working Life: Initiatives and Problems. 
Non-salaried Working Women in Europe: Women Run-
ning their own Businesses or Working Independently 
– Women Involved in their Husbands’ Professional 
Activity; Social Europe.  (1983-97, 180 items, 25,000 
p.).  Serial, with supplements, three times a year, on 
employment, equal treatment, health and security, etc. 
Individual documents: Evolution ete tendances de 
la securite sociale.  (1959, 2,500 p.); Formation profes-
sionnelle des travailleurs qualifies dans les pays de la 
C.E.E.  (1962, 810 p.); Conference europeenne sur la 
securite social.  2 vols.  (1962,. 1,125 p.); Social Policy 
of the EEC Commission: A General Survey: Achieve-
ments and Trends at the End of 1967.  (100 p.); The EEC 
on the Eve of the Customs Union. (1968, 110 p.); Pri-
vatisation et securite sociale – rapport pour la Commis-
sion des Communautes Europeennes.  (1986, 350 p.).
Equal Opportunities
Serials: Equal opportunities annual report.  (1996-
99, 100p.); Annual reports on equal pay for men and 
women.  (1960-80, 1,040 p.); Women of Europe 
Newsletter. (Late 1970s to mid 1990s, 14,000 p.). 
Covers wide variety of social and economic issues.
individual documents: L’emploi des femmes et 
ses problemes dans les etats membres de la commu-
naute europeenne - Sullerot report.  (1973, 245 p.); 
also abridged version, The employment of women 
and the problems it raises in the [community].  (55 p.).
Energy and Transport
The collection for energy includes about 
170,000 total pages; about 40,300 pages are listed 
here.  The collection for transport includes about 
206,000 total pages; about 16,700 are listed here.
Energy
Serials: Energy in Europe.  (1985-present, 18,000 
p.).  Includes volumes on topical issues, plus Annu-
al Energy Review; La conjoncture energetique dans 
la Communaute/The Energy Situation in the Com-
munity.  Situation and Outlook.  1962-84, 1,500 p.).
Series: Energy, series.  (1970-1980s, 70 items, 
20,000 p.).  Sample titles: Economic Activity and Ener-
gy Demand – Link to Energy Flow; Example: France. 
(1980, 106 p.); Input-Output and Energy Demand 
Models for Ireland: Data Collection Report.  (1981, 90 
p.); A Dynamic Energy Model for the Countries of the 
European Communities: Simulation as an Instrument 
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for Energy Planning.  (1978, 260 p.); Method of Calcu-
lating the Cost of Electricity Generation from Nuclear 
and Conventional Thermal Stations.  (1982, 85 p.).
Individual documents: The Community Oil Sector 
Medium-term Forecast and Guidelines.  (about 1980, 
80 p,); Prospects of Primary Energy Demand in the 
Community (1975 – 1980 – 1985).  (1972, 125 p.); 
Problems, Resources and Necessary Progress in Com-
munity Energy Policy 1975-1985.  (early 1970s, 55 p.).
Transport
Serials: Market for Solid Fuels in the Com-
munity.  (1983-99, 1,100 p.); Trans-Eu-
ropean Networks.  (1990-2000, 300 p.).
Series: Etudes/Studies.  Transport Series. 
(1965-82, nine items, 1,250 p.); Europa Transport 
– Market developments.  (1980s, 50 items, 3,550 
p.).  Focuses on “…statistical information on the in-
ternational intra-Community transport of goods col-
lected under the “Market Developments’ reports”; 
Transport Research.  (1996-98, 55 items, 10,000 p.).
Individual documents: Rapport sur la situation de 
l’infrastructure et du parc des transports dans la com-
munaute.  1961-2.  (Three items, 370 p.); European 
Transport: Crucial Problems and Research Needs – A 
Long-term Analysis.  (1982, 110 p.); Employment in 
Europe 1996: Analysis of Key Issues.  (1997, 61 p.).
Enterprise and Industry
Enterprise and industry includes areas such as 
industrial policy, businesses, innovation, and regula-
tion.  This is a highly interdisciplinary area.  The main 
policy areas here are enterprise policy, entrepreneur-
ship, industrial policy, competitiveness and innova-
tion, and some of these are closely related to employ-
ment and social affairs.  The collection includes about 
280,000 total pages; about 101,200 are listed here.
Serials: Panorama of EC Industry: An Extensive 
Review of the Situation and Outlook of the Manu-
facturing and Service Industries.  (1989-97, 8,600 
p.); Shipbuilding industry annual report.  (1978-88, 
300 p.); The European Aerospace Industry – Trad-
ing Position and Figures.  (1973-97, 960 p.); Annual 
Reports of the European Observatory for SMEs. 
(1993-8, 2,500 p.); TARIC (Integrated Tariff of the 
European Communities).  (1984-2000, 42,000 p.). 
Designed to show the various rules applying to spe-
cific products when imported into the Community; 
Common Customs Tariff.  (1961-2004, 24,000 p.).
Series: Etudes/Studies.  Indus-
try series. (1971-75, 18 items, 4,500 p.).
Individual documents: Industrial Policy in the Com-
munity.  (1970, 400 p.); Industrial Policy in the Commu-
nity: Memorandum from the Commission to the Coun-
cil.  (1970, 385 p.); Stage reached in Work on Industrial 
Policy in the Community.  (1972, 50 p.); Prospects for 
Industrial Research in the European Economic Com-
munity.  (1973, 210 p); Industrial Innovation: A Guide 
to Community Action, Services and Funding.  (1984, 
125 p.); Operations of the European Community con-
cerning SME Practical Handbook 1986.  (225 p.); 
Meeting the Global Challenge: Establishing a Suc-
cessful European Industrial Policy.  (1992, 155 p.).
Environment
The Community expressed its first formal inter-
est in environmental policy in the early 1970s.  De-
spite this relatively late start, there is a good deal of 
research on various aspects of the environment since 
the 1970s.  The collection includes about 210,000 
total pages; about 46,900 pages are listed here.
The term “environment” is highly interdisciplin-
ary; here the term will be used broadly, including ar-
eas such as environmental policy, environment and 
health, pollution, and occupational health and safety.
Serials: European Topic Centre reports on air 
emissions, inland waters, nature conservation, 
air quality, and land cover.  (1995--, 13,300 p,).
Series: Six successive Environmental Action Pro-
grammes (1973-present) are listed under the Health 
and Consumer Protection policy area below; Environ-
ment and Quality of Life, series.  (1970s-1990s, 130 
items, 20,000 p.).  Sample titles: Noxious Effects of 
Dangerous Substances in the Aquatic Environment. 
(1978, 600 p.); Levels of Pollution of the Environment 
by the Principal Pollutants.  (1977, 120 p.); Study of 
the Techniques for the Determination of the Enteric 
Viruses.  (1978, 125 p.); Control of Nitrogen Oxide 
Emissions from European Cars.  (1978, 155 p.); The 
European Communities Research Project on Open-
top Chambers – Results on Agricultural Crops 1987-
1988.  (1989, 175 p.); Agriculture and Environment: 
Management Agreements in Four Countries of the 
European Communities.  (1987, 230 p.); Identification 
and Quantification of Atmospheric Emission Sources 
of Heavy Metals and Dust from Metallurgical Pro-
cesses and Waste Incineration.  (1987, 110 p.); Com-
munity Water Quality Policy for the Nineties.  (1989, 
10 p.); Bilan des connaissances et des applications 
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de l’agriculture biologique et interet pour ;’agricul-
ture communautaire.  Situation des pays de la CEE. 
(1989, 615 p.).  Two volumes cover 12 member states; 
Environmental Issues Series.  (1997--, 3,500 p.).
Additional series: Organic Micropollutants in 
the Aquatic Environment: Proceedings…  The Eu-
ropean Commission hosted 6 symposiums be-
tween 1978 and 1990 (Six items, 2,800 p.).  Typi-
cal themes: partitioning of organic pollutants in the 
aquatic environment; monitoring micropollutants; 
novel analytical techniques in environmental chem-
istry; chemical and photochemical oxidation; Ecosys-
tems Research Report series.  (1991-99, 30 items, 
3,000 p.).  Sample  titles: Fire in Mediterranean Eco-
systems; Introduced Species in European Coastal 
Waters; Global Change in Europe’s Cold Regions.
Individual documents: there are also literally hun-
dreds of individual titles on various aspects of the 
environment.  One could trace individual themes 
through many of these.  Sample individual titles:
Inventaire des dispositions legislatives, reglemen-
taires et administratives relatives a la lutte contre la 
pollution des eaux de surface, en vigueur ou projetees 
dans les etats du parc de C.E.  (1974, 380 p.); Non-
organic Micropollutants of the Environment.  Volume 
1 – General Presentation; Volume 2 – Detailed List-
ings of Levels Present in the Environment. Volume 3 
– Synthesis of Data. Volume 4 – Methods of Analysis. 
Report of a Working Group of Experts.  (1974, 680 p.); 
Europe’s Environment: The Dobris Assessment. Also 
follow-up Second Assessment.  (1995, 1998, 1,100 p.); 
Protecting Europe’s Environment. The Environmental 
Policy of the European Community.  (1992, 20 p.).
Health and Consumer Protection
Health includes areas such as public health, in-
dustrial health, diseases (both non-and communi-
cable), mental health, health and the environment, 
and food safety.  Health and consumer protection did 
not take a prominent place on the Community politi-
cal agenda until the 1990s.  Nevertheless, there is 
considerable material available on the environment 
and health and industrial health from the 1970s.  The 
collection includes about 35,000 total pages; about 
23,450 pages are listed here.   Concerted Commu-
nity action in the field of consumer affairs began in the 
1990s, as an aspect of the Single Market.  Consumer 
policy includes areas such as consumer education, 
protection, and rights.  The collection includes about 
22,000 total pages; about 1,730 pages are listed here.
Serials: Information Bulletin of the Steel In-
dustry Safety and Health Commission.  (1970-
81, 650 p.).  Focus on conditions and accident 
prevention; Annual reports on safety, hygiene 
and health at work.  (1975-late 1990s, 800 p.).
Series: The Community has published a great deal 
on environmental and industrial health issues.  The ef-
fect of the natural environment on human health has 
been a major concern of the European Community 
(EC) since the 1970s.  The EC has sponsored a series 
of environmental research and action programs, which 
were aimed at providing scientific and technical infor-
mation and support to the European Community policy 
on the environment.  Under these programs, the Com-
munity supplied grants for varied research programs. 
First Environmental Action Programme 1973-1976 
(465 p.); Second Environmental Action Programme 
1977-1981 (1,950 p.); Third Environmental Action Pro-
gramme 1982-1986 (500 p.); Fourth Environmental 
Action Programme 1987-1992. (500 p.); Fifth Environ-
mental Action Programme 1993-2000. (500 p.); Sixth 
Environmental Action Programme 2002-2012. (500 
p.); International Symposium: Proceedings; Recent 
Advances in the Assessment of the Health Effects of 
Environmental Pollution, Paris, 24-28, 1974.  4 vol-
umes.  (2,550 p.).  Co-published by Commission of the 
European Communities, World Health Organization, 
and United States Environmental Protection Agency; 
Indoor Air Quality & Its Impact on Man reports 1-19. 
(1988-97, 1,000 p.); Industrial Health and Safety pam-
phlets.  (1977-80, 10 items, 1,750 p.): Report of the 
Mine Safety Commission/Report of the Mine Safety and 
Health Commission.  (1957-82, 25 items, 10,000 p.). 
Contains wide variety of expert reports, evaluations, 
and statistics; Health in mines: Synthesis Report on 
Research in the Third Programme 1971-1976.  (214 p.).
Individual documents: The Organization, Financ-
ing and Cost of Health Care in the European Commu-
nity.  (1979, 161 p.); National Health Survey Systems 
in the European Economic Community.  (1977, 160 
p.); The Improvement of Safety and Health of Workers 
at Work.  (1993, 300 p.); Hardness of Drinking Wa-
ter and Public Health. Proceedings of the European 
Scientific Colloquium, Luxembourg, 1975.  (560 p.); 
Public Health in Europe.   (1997, 195 p.); The State 
of Women’s Health in the European Community. 
(1997, 135 p.); European Guidelines on Quality Cri-
teria for Diagnostic Radiographic Images in Paedis-
trics. (1996, 61 p.); European Protocol on Dosimetry 
in Mammography.  (1996, 76 p.); European Guidelines 
for Quality Assurance in Mammography Screening. 
2nd.  (1996, 210 p.); Europeans and Cancer Preven-
tion: Food Consumption Habits, Smoking and Can-
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cer Screening for Women. (March-April 1988). (120 
p.); Some like it “light”: Women and Smoking in the 
European Union. European Report.  (1999, 75 p.).
Consumer Protection
Individual documents: The Judicial and Quasi-
judicial Means of Consumer Protection.  Symposium. 
(1975, 320 p.); After Sales Service in the EEC.  (1976, 
275 p.); Consumer Protection and Information Policy. 
First Report.  Also Second Report and Third Report. 
(1977, 1979, 1981, 230 p.); Proceedings of the Sym-
posium of Consumer Organizations on 2 and 3 De-
cember 1976.  (125 p.); The Consumer Organizations 
and the Public Authorities.  (1977, 65 p.); Food Addi-
tives for the Consumer.  (1980, 54 p.); A New Impetus 
for Consumer Protection Policy.  (1985, 30 p.); Ten 
Years of Community Consumer Policy: A Contribu-
tion to a People’s Europe.  Document.  (1986, 120 p.); 
Withdrawal and Recall of Dangerous Products in the 
European Community and the Member States.  (1986, 
80 p.); Individual Choice and Higher Growth: The Aim 
of Consumer Policy in the Single Market.  1st.  Also 
2nd.  (1989, 130 p.); European Consumer Guide to 
the Single Market.  1st, 1994 and 2nd, 1995.  (440 p.).
Internal Market and Services
Internal market covers areas such as measures 
designed to promote the free movement of people, 
goods, capital, services, and the business environ-
ment.  The Community has always been active in vari-
ous aspects of the common market; activity increased 
during the 1980s in anticipation of the Single Market/
Internal Market.  The collection includes about 105,000 
total pages; about 54,000 pages are listed here.
Serials: Report on Community Measures Affecting 
Tourism.  1992-2002, 750 p.); Completing the Inter-
nal Market.  (1986-96, 6,500 p.); Inventory of taxes 
levied...  (1965-93, 10,000 p.).  These are compre-
hensive inventories of taxes levied by central govern-
ment and local authorities; Bulletin statistique de la 
Communaute europeenne du charbon et de l’acier, 
haute autorite.  (1952-61, 15,000 p.).  Concerns the 
European Coal and Steel Community.  Various lan-
guages; Informations statistiques.  (1953-59, 5,000 
p.).  Monthly.  Concerns the European Coal and Steel 
Community.  Information varies monthly, covers wide 
variety of topics, such as: trade between member 
states; industrial production; movement of workers; 
price structures and movement; salaries; social condi-
tions; Research on the “cost of non-Europe.”  16 vol-
umes.  (1986-88, 7,000 p.).  Study designed to “estab-
lish the cost of the present market fragmentation of the 
European Community and thus, the potential benefit 
to be derived from the removal of market barriers.” 
Series: Single Market Review.  Thirty-
eight volumes plus survey.  (1997, 9,500 p.).
Individual documents: Les aspects economiques 
de la liberte d’etablissement et de prestation de ser-
vices dans la Communaute economique europeenne. 
Conference internationale…9 et 10 juin 1967.  (220 p.).
Regional Policy
Regional policy was first put in place in the early 
1970s, with the creation of the European Regional De-
velopment Fund.  The collection includes about 70,000 
total pages; about 19,600 pages are listed here.
Serials: Annual Report of the Cohesion Fund. 
(1993-99, 1,800 p.); European Regional Devel-
opment Fund.  (1973-98, 1,700 p.); Annual Re-
port on the Structural Funds.  (1990-99, 2,000 p.).
Series: Studies.  Regional Policy Series.  (1980s, 
4,000 p.).   Sample titles: Study of the Regional Im-
pact of the Community’s External Trade Policy. (1984, 
124 p.); Integrated Development of Mountain Areas: 
The Alpine Region. (1981, 90 p.); The Role of the Ter-
tiary Sector in Regional Policy: A Comparative Study. 
(1980, 230 p.); Regional Development Studies, se-
ries.  (1992-99,  8,000 p.).  Research studies on vari-
ous aspects of regional development.  Sample titles: 
The EU Compendium of Spatial Planning Systems 
and Policies: France.  (2000, 150 p.); The Impact of 
Economic and Monetary Union on Cohesion.  (2000, 
94 p.); The Prospective Development of the Northern 
Seaboard.  (1995, 200 p.); Programmes: Regional De-
velopment Programme, ____, 1977-1980.  (1978-9, 
six items, 900 p.).  Regional Policy Series.  One gen-
eral, others on Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Neth-
erlands, United Kingdom; Regional development Pro-
gramme (second generation), 1981-85.  (Six items, 
1,100 p.).  On Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Green-
land, Ireland, Luxembourg, four French, two English.
Individual documents: A Regional Policy for the 
Community.  (1969, 260 p.).  Also in French; Documents 
de la Conference sur les economies regionales.  Two 
volumes.  (1961, 675 p.); La politique regionale dans 
la Communaute economique europeenne.  (1964, 405 
p.); Regional Development in the Community: An Ana-
lytical Survey.  Also in French.  (1971, 315 p.); Region-
al Economic Structures and Policies in Denmark, Ire-
land, Norway and the United Kingdom.  (1972, 210 p.); 
Relocation of Economic Activities traditionally located 
in the Copenhagen Area.  Final report.  (1978, 230 p.). 
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Series, Internal documentation on regional policy in 
the Community; Europe 2000: Outlook for the Devel-
opment of the Community’s Territory.  (1991. 210p.).
Research
The Community’s research policy was for-
mally initiated in the 1970s-since then there have 
been successive research framework programs. 
The collection includes about 240,000 total pag-
es in this area; about 34,100 pages are listed here.
Serials: The Community’s Research and Develop-
ment Programme on Radioactive Waste Management 
and Storage: Annual Progress Reports.  (1989-93, 
3,000 p.); Industry Research and Technology.  Weekly. 
(1969-71, 6,000 p.); The European Report on Science 
and Technology Indicators. (1994, 1997, 2003, 2,000 p.).
Series: Science and Technology Policy series. 
(Twelve items, 6,000 p.).  Sample titles: The Evalu-
ation of Research and Development: Recommenda-
tions and Main Contributions.  (1979, 460 p.); The 
Evaluation of Research and Development: Summary 
of the Recommendations and Main Contributions. 
Two volumes.  (1979, 550 p.);  The Comparison and 
Coordination of National Policies and Programmes 
in the Energy Research and Development Sector. 
(1978, 185 p.); Research and Development series. 
(1960-70s, 4,000 p.).  Sample titles: Public Financ-
ing of Research and Development in the Commu-
nity Countries 1967-1970: Analysis by Objectives. 
(1970, 140 p.);  La recherché industrielle alimentaire 
dans les pays de la Communaute europeenne.  Two 
parts.  (1,000 p.);  Etude sur les modalites de ges-
tion des credits de recherché: rapport de synthese. 
(1972, 50 p.); Utilization of the Results of Public 
Research and Development in _____.  On Member 
States.  (1989, 2,000 p.); Research on Raw Materials/
Research on Secondary Raw Materials.  On miner-
als, aluminum, waste disposal, etc.  (1979, 9,000 p.).
Individual documents: Recherche – developpe-
ment et concurrence dans les Communautes europ-
eennes du parc Colloque internationale…Grenoble les 
16 et 17 avril 1970.  (340 p.); The Europe plus Thirty 
Report.  (1974, 500 p.).  Forecast of future of fields 
of science and technology; Industrial Food Research 
in the Countries of the European Community.  (1975, 
360 p.); Evaluation of the Community’s Environmental 
Research Programmes (1976-1983).  (1986, 255 p.). 
Research Evaluation Report No. 14; Evaluation of the 
Community’s Medical and Public Health Research Pro-
grammes (1980-1986).  (1986, 50 p.).  Research Eval-
uation Report No. 15; Evaluation of the Community’s 
Primary Material Raw Materials Programmes.  (1986, 
255 p.).  Research Evaluation Report No. 16; Interdis-
ciplinary Research in the Mediterranean Sea: A Syn-
thesis of Scientific Results from the Mediterranean Tar-
geted Project (MTP) Phase I 1993-96.  (1997, 344 p.).
External Relations
The major categories in external relations include: 
general category (which includes the political status 
of the Community, or its ability of its Member States 
to act as a unit), focusing on relations with third coun-
tries; development; external trade.  In the first decades 
of Community existence, economic affairs and inter-
nal development were more important than the politi-
cal status of the Community.  But with the Maastricht 
Treaty, new emphasis was put on the political status of 
the Community.  Development policy was an important 
part of external relations since the 1970s. Trade poli-
cy has been a consistent concern for the Community 
since the 1950s.  There are about 195,000 total pages 
in the general collection; about 61,500 pages are list-
ed here.  There are about 170,000 total pages in the 
development collection; about 59,400 pages are listed 
here.  There are about 5,000,000 total pages in the 
external trade section, and nearly all are listed here.
 
General
Serials: Convention on Internation-
al Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora.  (1984-99, 7,000 p.). 
Series: Europe Information-External Relations. 
(1978-89, 1,300 p.); Association and cooperation 
agreements linking EU with non-member states. 
(1984-88, 50,000 p.).  Sample title: 14-volume an-
nual on the relations between the Community and 
Turkey; the last volume in the series is entitled As-
sociation between the European Economic Com-
munity and Turkey.  Fourteenth Annual Report of the 
Association Council to the Parliamentary Commit-
tee of the Association.  report (1965-78, 1,960 p.).
Individual documents: The European Com-
munity, International Organizations and Multilat-
eral Agreements.  (1977, 1980, 1983, 850 p.); 
Relations between the European Community 
and International Organisations.  (1989,  375 p.).
Development
Serials: Report on the Implementation of Financial 
and Technical Assistance to Asia and Latin America. 
(1979-98, 700 p.); Annual review of aid given by the 
EU to ACP countries.  (1982-2000, 1,260 p.); Europe 
Information-Development.  (1978-92, 1,930 p.); An-
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nual Report of the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers. 
(1977-2000, 1,750 p.); Report to the ACP-EEC Coun-
cil of Ministers on the Implementation of Financial 
and Technical Assistance.  (1967-89, 1,800 p.); Four 
Lome Conventions, 1975-2000.  (3,000 p.).  Acts, 
agreements, texts, etc.; Ten Years of Lome: A Record 
of ACP-EEC Partnership, 1976-1985: Report on the 
Implementation of Financial and Technical Coopera-
tion under the First Two Lome Conventions.  (1986, 63 
p.); Report from the Commission on the Operation of 
the Export Earnings Stabilisation System.  (1977-99, 
800 p.); PHARE – Report on the Implementation of Fi-
nancial Assistance to the Countries of East and Cen-
tral Europe.  (1991-99, 380 p.); Commission Report 
on Cooperation with European Non-governmental Or-
ganizations (NGOs) in Fields concerning Developing 
Countries.  (1978-89, 1,500 p.); The Courier.  (1973-
98, 24,000 p.).  Monthly magazine on developments 
in ACP countries; Bulletin d’information – Produite 
et commerce des pays en voie de development. 
(1964-71, 700 p.); European Development Fund 
pamphlets on African countries.  (1960-75, 60 p.).
Series: Etudes/Studies. (1963-79, 1,900 p.).  Most 
on economics or production in developing areas; Se-
ries on Structural Economics and Industrial Studies on 
Developing Countries.  (Early 1970s, 4,200 p.).  On 
Africa; Possibilities de creation d’industries expor-
tatrices dans les etats africains et malgache asso-
cies.  (1974, 6,000 p.); Possibilities d’industrialisation 
des etats africains et malgache associes.  (1966-67, 
5,600 p.); Les conditions d’installation d’enterprises 
industrielles.  (1972-74, 4,500 p.).  On  countries.
Individual documents: Document du travail sur 
la situation et la structure politiques administratives 
et economiques des Pays ete Territoires d’Outre-
Mer associes a la Communaute (etabli a l’intention 
des members de l’Assemblee Parlementaire Europ-
eenne).  (1958, 55 p.); Le role de l’aide publique des 
Pays de la CEE dans l’aide mondiale aux Pays en 
voie de developpement (1962-1966).  (55 p.); Memo 
de statistiques - Pays et Territoires non-europeennes 
des etats members de la CEE-Annee 1959.  (255 p.); 
Rapport sur la situation social dans les pays d’outre-
mer associes a la Communaute economique europ-
eenne.  (1960, 255 p.); Memorandum on a Commu-
nity Policy on Development Cooperation.  Synoptic 
and Programme for Initial Actions.  (1972, 305 p.).
Trade, external
Serials: Foreign Trade Analytical Tables.  NIMEXE 
Imports.  NIMEXE Exports.  (1976-92, 5,000,000 p.).
Series: Practical Guide to the Use of the Eu-
ropean Communities’ Scheme of Generalized 
Tariff Preferences.  (1976-86, 3,500 p.); GATT 
multilateral trade negotiations.  (1979, 850 p.).  Euro-
pean Commission report to Council on negotiations.
Documents on Scientific and Technical Topics
The European Atomic Energy Community (EURA-
TOM), which merged into the European Communities 
in 1967, produced a massive amount of documen-
tation (about 2,006.000 pages).  Most EURATOM 
publications are of a strictly scientific and techni-
cal nature which are of little use to administrative or 
policy areas.  The major research focus was on the 
peaceful development of nuclear energy.  The EUR 
series contains the bulk of this technical and scien-
tific literature, which is in various languages.  One 
serial is Transactions of the International Confer-
ence on Structural Mechanics in Reactor Technol-
ogy.  1st-8th conferences.  (1972-85, 32,000 p.).
Phil Wilkin is  bibliographer for West European Stud-
ies and curator of European Union Archival Collection 
at the University of Pittsburgh
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EUSA  
Lifetime 
Membership
What is it?
Simply put, it is a one-time dues pay-
ment to EUSA of US$ 1500.
What does it include?
The Lifetime Membership includes 
all regular membership benefits for 
life. Among those benefits currently 
are subscription to the quarterly EUSA 
Review, receipt of occasional EUSA 
monographs, discounted registration 
rates at the EUSA International Con-
ference, subscription to our e-mail List 
Serve, and the opportunity to join EUSA 
interest sections. 
Are there any other benefits?
By making a one-time membership 
payment, you not only avoid the task 
of renewing each year, but gain the 
twin advantages of securing lifetime 
membership at today’s dollar values 
and avoiding future dues increases.
Who should do this?
Any person wishing to support the en-
deavors of the European Union Studies 
Association—the fostering of schol-
arship and inquiry on the European 
integration project. For U.S. taxpayers, 
an additional benefit is a receipt for a 
one-time $500 charitable contribution 
to EUSA, tax-deductible to the extent 
allowed by law (reducing your tax li-
ability for the year in which you become 
a Lifetime Member).
How do I become a Lifetime Member?
Simply mail your check, in US$ and 
made payable to “EUSA,” to the Euro-
pean Union Studies Association, ad-
dress given at right. (We can not accept 
lifetime membership payments by credit 
card.) We will send you a receipt and 
letter of acknowledgment.
EuropEan union StudiES aSSociation
New Individual Membership Form Only (Please type or print)
Name ________________________________________________
Address ______________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
City _________________________________________________
State/Province________________  Postal Code_______________
Country ______________________________________________
Work Telephone _______________________________________
Work Facsimile ________________________________________
E-mail _______________________________________________
Your Professional Affiliation ______________________________
_____________________________________________________
Do you wish to be subscribed to
EUSA’s e-mail List Serve?  _____ yes          _____ no
Membership dues (please check as appropriate):
Individual _____ $90 two-year membership
Student* _____ $55 two-year membership
Lifetime Membership _____ $1500 (+ credit for $500 tax deduction)
* Students must provide copy of current semester’s registration form.
EU Law Interest Section   _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU Political Economy Interest Section     _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
Teaching the EU Interest Section  _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU Latin America Caribbean Interest Section   _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU Economics Interest Section  _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU Public Opinion and Participation Section    _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU as Global Actor Section   _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EUSA Public Policy Interest Section  _____ $10 )2 yrs.)
EUSA members may wish to make a contribution to support the work 
of EUSA in any amount over membership dues:
 EUSA Grants and Scholarships Fund $ _____
 Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies $ _____
Total amount of dues and gifts enclosed       $ ________
We prefer payment by check (payable to “EUSA”) when possible. 
Checks must be in US$ and drawn on a USA bank. We also accept 
international money orders and MasterCard or Visa credit cards. Your 
cancelled check or credit card statement will be your receipt.
MasterCard  #  _________/__________/__________/_________
Visa  # _________/__________/__________/_________
Expiry ___/___  Last 3 digits from back side of card ___/___/___
Signature ____________________________________________
Mail or fax this form (please do not mail and fax this form) to:
    European Union Studies Association
    415 Bellefield Hall
    University of Pittsburgh
    Pittsburgh, PA 15260  USA
    Facsimile 412.648.1168 
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Lifetime Membership
$1500 for all our materials, for life, and credit for a one-time tax-deductible contribution of $500
EUSA Grants and Scholarships Fund
to support EU-related scholarship, the EUSA prizes, and travel to the biennial EUSA Conference
Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies 
to honor the seminal work of Ernst B. Haas and support dissertation research in EU studies
Your gifts are tax-deductible to the extent allowable by U.S. tax law. Include a contribution with your membership 
renewal, or contact the EUSA Office to make a contribution. Call 412.648.7635 or e-mail eusa@pitt.edu.
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